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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The swine industry is of significant importance to Iowa's 
economy. Iowa produces approximately 25% of the total U.S. 
hog production (USDA, Meat Animals: Production, Disposition 
and Income). It was estimated that in 1987 there were 68,100 
jobs in Iowa related to the pork industry (Otto, 1987). Cash 
receipts from hogs marke~ed in Iowa total over $2.7 billion 
annually (Iowa Agricultural Statistics, 1988). 
These figures show the relative importance of the swine 
industry to Iowa. However, the future of this industry needs 
to be evaluated if Iowa is going to maintain its dominant 
position in the production of pork. 
Recent studies have shown that only the top Iowa 
producers compete with large-scale swine producers in other 
regions and that the majority of Iowa swine production lacks 
in efficiency and performance. This concern has led 
agricultural researchers to search for ways to improve and 
maintain Iowa's competitive position in the production of 
pork. One effective method of increasing Iowa swine 
producers' performance is through increased management. This 
study investigates the feasibility of a cooperative that 
provides management services to Iowa swine producers. 
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Structural Changes in the Swine Industry 
The swine industry in the United States has been 
experiencing a period of dramatic structural change. Although 
the number of farms producing hogs has been declining since 
the beginning of this century, the loss in swine farmers has 
accelerated sharply over the past 30 years. The number of 
swine farms declined over 75% from 1959 to the present (USDA, 
Hogs and Pigs; Rhodes, 1990a). This reduction in actual 
numbers of farms with hogs has been offset by an increase in 
the average swine farm size. Even more interesting is that 
while the number of farms producing hogs has declined, the 
number of large farms selling over 1,000 hogs per year has 
actually increased from 1,500 farms in 1959 to 23,900 in 1987 
(USDA, Hogs and Pigs). The swine industry has evolved from an 
industry characterized by many small farms dispersed across 
the United States to fewer, larger, highly specialized swine 
farms concentrated in the Midwest and Midsouth. 
A related structural change in the swine industry is the 
growth of multiunits. A multiple unit consists of several 
farms or production units managed by a single entity. A 
typical multiunit operates one or two farms in addition to the 
homeplace (Rhodes, 1990a). In 1987 the number of multiunits 
was almost 20% of the total number of operators producing hogs 
and almost one-half of the marketings from multiunits came 
from operations marketing 5,000+ hogs per year (Rhodes, 
1990a) . This shows the impact on the hog industry that 
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multiple units have on the numbers of hogs produced and 
marketed. 
Another change in the swine industry has been the 
increase in contracting activity over the previous twenty 
years. A contract is an agreement between a contractor and a 
grower. Growers typically provide labor and the care of 
animals in their own facilities. The contractor furnishes 
feed and typically provides and owns the animals. Growers are 
paid fees which generally reflect the level of production that 
they are able to achieve with the contractor's hogs. Between 
8% and 12% of the hogs in the United States are produced under 
contract (McDaniel et al., 1988; Rhodes, 1990b). 
These structural changes in the swine industry have been 
combined with a shift in the regional production of hogs. 
North Carolina has increased their share of U.S. hog 
production from 1.8% in 1955 to 4.5% in 1987 (USDA, Meat 
Animals: Production, Disposition and Income). This shift in 
production has been caused by the formation of large farms in 
the Southeast. In 1987, 58% of the hog farms in North 
Carolina marketed over 5,000 hogs annually. In Iowa, fewer 
than 10% of all swine farms were that large (Rhodes, 1990a). 
These large farms in the Southeast are potentially Iowa's 
greatest competitor in the production of pork due to their 
scale and efficiency. 
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Relation to cattle f eedinq industry 
These structural changes show that there is a 
reorganization occurring in the swine industry. These changes 
resemble those that previously occurred in the broiler and 
cattle feeding industries (Rhodes, 1990a; Hillburn, 1988). 
Prior to 1960, cattle feeding was dominated by small 
farmer-feeders which were mainly located in the Corn Belt. 
The industy was characterized by large numbers of small 
farmers with diversified operations. Cattle feeding then 
started to shift to large, specialized commercial feedlots in 
the Southern Plains and Western states. Over the period 
between 1955 and 1978, cattle marketings in the Corn Belt 
decreased from 39% to 20% of total U.S. marketings. Over the 
same time period cattle marketings in the Southern Plains 
increased from 14% to 45% (Reimund et al., 1981). 
Structural change within an industry can be broken down 
into four identifiable steps: (Reimund et al., 1981) 
1. New innovations and technologies are developed for 
an industry. 
2. Production shifts to new areas more amenable to the 
new methods as opposed to the traditional methods. 
3. New areas of production grow and develop possibly 
causing overproduction. 
4. Industrialization occurs in the industry which 
results in vertical coordination and contracting 
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which shifts the control of product flows from 
producers to the processing and marketing stages. 
The growth of large-scale, specialized hog production 
operations using new technologies that are being developed 
outside of traditional hog producing regions tends to suggest 
that the swine industry is following in the footsteps of the 
cattle feeding industry. Producers in the emerging areas, 
such as North Carolina, are new entrants in hog production 
with operations of substantial size . With contracting 
activities there is also some vertical integration occurring 
with the input supply or output processing activities related 
to swine production. This information tends to suggest that 
the swine industry is in the second, or "shift in location of 
production", stage of the structural change process (Reimund 
et al., 1981). However, the majority of hog production is 
still located in the Corn Belt (USDA, Meat Animals: 
Production, Disposition and Income). 
Other swine industry concerns 
In addition to these structural changes occurring in the 
swine industry there are also other pressures influencing the 
industry . Consumers are demanding a leaner product as health 
concerns have led them to reduce the level of fat in their 
diet. Regulations and penalties regardi ng disposal of waste 
products from swine farms have received much interest. Animal 
rights activists are constantly challenging swine producers 
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and their building designs. There has also been an increase 
in the number of larger swine farms with extensive management 
in Iowa, as well as other areas of the United States, which 
has brought on the concern that the Iowa swine industry needs 
to become more efficient and productive if it is going to 
continue to survive and grow against this competition 
(Hillburn, 1988) . 
Effects of structural Changes on Iowa Producers 
A study conducted by the Iowa State University Swine Task 
Force addresses the subject of management in pork production 
(Kliebenstein, et al., 1988). Iowa has been producing 
approximately 25% of the total U. S. hog production for the 
past three decades (USDA, Meat Animals: Production, 
Disposition and Income). In recent years it has been shown 
that it is not necessary to produce hogs in a region where 
feedstuffs are abundant to have a competitive advantage 
(Kliebenstein et al., 1988) . The study compared Iowa swine 
producers with "intensively managed" operations. These 
"intensively managed" operations were located primarily in the 
Atlantic coastal region and Midsouth, but would include Iowa 
producers also. These swine operations with specialized 
management are usually the only enterprise in the farm unit, 
rather than being part of a diversified farming operation. 
They hire labor which has been trained to one specific area of 
swine production and tend to substitute assets for labor. 
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The study showed that only about the top 20-25% of Iowa 
swine producers are on a comparable basis to the "intensively 
managed" operations. This information is summarized in Table 
1.1 (Kliebenstein et al., 1988). 
Table 1.1 Comparison of Iowa top 10 and 20 percent with 
competition, 1986 (farrow to finish) 
Feed cost/cwt. 
Fixed cost/cwt. 
Diet cost/cwt. 
Total cost/cwt. 
Feed efficiency 
Avg hd mkt/yr 
Litters/sow/yr 
Pigs/sow/ yr 
Pigs weaned/lit 
Death loss, % 
Iowa Producers 
Too 10% 
$18.77 
$4.05 
$5.22 
$29.30 
3.61 
1036 
1.76 
13.95 
7.93 
15.02 
Top 20% 
$19.41 
$4.23 
$5.38 
$30.78 
3.63 
1260 
1. 78 
14.42 
8.10 
14.95 
Average 
$22.56 
$6.53 
$5.80 
$38.02 
4.05 
1249 
1.77 
14 . 12 
7.98 
16.10 
Intensively 
Managed Operations 
$20.11 
N/ A 
$6.01 
$32.50 
3.40 
5000 
2.10 
18.50 
8.80 
10.00 
The intensively managed operations are larger in size 
than the average Iowa swine producer. However, their 
advantage comes from their production efficiency, rather than 
the scope of their operation. For example, over the period 
1983-1986 the "intensively managed" operation's total cost per 
hundred lb. of pork produced was $4.06 lower than the top one-
third of Iowa producers, which is illustrated in Table 1 . 2. 
The results of this study conclude that "management intensity 
is the key to remaining competitive in pork production" 
(Kliebenstein et al., 1988, p. 62). 
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Table 1.2 Comparison of Iowa producers with competition, 
(1983-1986) 
Iowa Producers 
Too One-Third Low One-Third 
Feed cost/cwt.a $23.76 $28.27 
Fixed cost/cwt. $6.77 $9.76 
Total cost/cwt. $38.20 $48.40 
Pigs/sow/yr 15.01 13.72 
Feed efficiency 3.72 4.09 
Avg hd mkt/yr 1422 1171 
Intensively 
Managed Operations 
$21.24 
$5.50 
$34.14 
18.00 
3.40 
5000 
a Assunes an aver age corn pr ice of S2.50/ bushel. COll1)et i tion feed cost i s adjusted according to diet 
cost relationship between Iowa average and COll1)etition shown in Table 1. 1. 
While these specialized farms located outside the Corn 
Belt are superior in their performance as compared to average 
Iowa swine producers, the loss of the pork industry from Iowa 
is not a foregone conclusion. Producers in the Corn Belt have 
the intrinsic advantage of being located close to a supply of 
feedstuffs and processing plants for their products. Smaller 
swine operations located in Iowa can compete and survive, but 
to do so they are going to need increased management. 
Problem statement 
The Iowa State University Swine Task Force study which 
showed only the top 20% to 25% of Iowa swine producers are 
competitive against "intensively managed" operations combined 
with the beginning of a shift in the regional production of 
pork identifies the need to develop and strengthen Iowa's 
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competitive advantage in swine production. Iowa producers 
need to become more competitive and efficient in their 
production of pork if they are going to survive in this ever-
changing industry. One of the best ways to accomplish this 
task is through increased management levels. One viable 
solution for providing these additional management services 
could be through the creation of management cooperatives to 
assist farmers in reaching this goal. The objective of this 
thesis is to study the feasibility of a cooperative providing 
these key management services to Iowa swine producers. 
Management Cooperatives 
Description of a manaqem~nt cooperative 
A cooperative is defined as a user-owned and controlled 
business that distributes benefits on the basis of use (Cobia, 
1989). The fundamental purpose of an agricultural cooperative 
is to improve the economic well-being of farmers, whether 
financially or with other measures. This purpose is 
accomplished through the provision of goods and services, 
access to markets, reduction of costs, sharing of risks, and 
increased farmer influence in the marketplace (USDA, 1987). 
The management cooperative will provide and fulfill all of 
these requirements of a cooperative. 
Traditionally cooperatives have provided feed, 
fertilizer, or supplies to farmers or provided a market for 
their product. The management cooperative may still provide 
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feed and supplies to swine farmers, but in addition it will 
provide management services. Some examples of management 
services could include, but are not limited to record keeping, 
nutrition analysis, ration formulation, supplying of superior 
genetics, on-farm consultation, veterinary and health 
programs, facility design, financing for the livestock and/ or 
buildings, and assisting in the originating and marketing of 
swine. 
There are some basic assumptions which need to be made in 
determining and explaining how the swine management 
cooperative would work. The cooperative will need to provide 
more than just an advisory service. Advisory or educational 
organizations cannot create the needed incentive for the 
farmer to actually change his or her production practices. A 
stronger relationship between the farmer-member and the 
cooperative must be created. For this reason, it is probably 
essential that the farmer and the cooperative enter into a 
legally binding contract. If there was no contract between 
these two participants there would be no assurance that the 
farmer or the cooperative would perform as intended . 
Participation in the management cooperative can be thought of 
as simply raising hogs under contract where the 
contractor is a cooperative, as opposed to another swine 
producer or a corporation. 
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Review of contracting 
Contract production of hogs has existed for over 30 
years. Prior to the 1980's there was very little contract hog 
production in the Corn Belt. However, contracting began to 
grow in the 1980's in response to the financial crisis 
(Futrell, 1989; Rhodes, 1990b). Currently between 8 and 10 
percent of hogs are produced under contract (McDaniel et al., 
1988). V. James Rhodes (1990b) suggests an upper limit of 
approximately 12 percent of the total U.S. slaughter is 
produced under contract in his report on contract hog 
production. A survey by Iowa State University and the Iowa 
Pork Producers Association showed that only 3.2% of Iowa 
farmers raise hogs under contract (Ginder, 1990). This tends 
to suggest heavier contracting activity in other parts of the 
U.S. and that there is great potential for the expansion of 
hog contracting in Iowa. 
Financial reasons appear to be the major incentive for 
contract hog production. Some other possible influences 
include: (1) inability to finance hog production either 
through internally generated equity or through credit, (2) 
unwillingness to assume the risk involved, (3) the need to 
utilize under-used resources, either physical facilities or 
labor, (4) the flexibility of being able to get in or out of 
hog production quickly, (5) the desire to reduce managerial 
expertise needed, (6) the high cost of capital and the desire 
to reduce capital input, and (7) the opportunity to be 
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guaranteed a minimum return (Futrell, 1989; McDaniel et al., 
1988) . 
The swine management cooperative engaged in contracting 
could be attractive to the financially troubled farmer. In 
the mid-1980's farmland asset values plummeted which caused a 
serious decline in the net worth of many farmers. This 
reduction in net worth reduced the farmers' borrowing 
capacity. Lenders became more stringent in their lending 
practices and farmers also became less willing to take on debt 
to finance expansion or continue with their present size of 
operation. Some producers downsized the scope of their 
operation and others were even forced into bankruptcy. 
"Those who wish to maintain the current independent 
producer centered structure must recognize that contracting 
provides what may be the only viable opportunity for skilled 
producers in financial difficulty or without adequate risk 
(equity) capital to use their skills" (Ginder, 1989, p. 10). 
The swine management cooperative could provide financially-
troubled producers with access to contracting and permit them 
to remain in swine production and at the same time they will 
have an opportunity to share in the profits generated. 
Contracting may also be an effective method of expanding 
a producer's operation without assuming much additional risk 
(McDaniel et al., 1988). Miyazaki (1984) expands on this idea 
and argues that cooperatives are often established as a way of 
restructuring a financially weak or bankruptcy-prone 
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entrepreneurial firm. The management cooperative will be 
appealing to financially troubled farmers for two distinct 
reasons. First, by joining a cooperative the farmer-members 
will still have some control in decision making and second, 
the contracting aspect will reduce the farmer-member's 
exposure to risk. 
Contracting with the management cooperative may allow 
farmers to substitute managerial services for labor. If a 
producer is limited in the size of his swine operation by a 
labor constraint, then the additional management provided by 
the cooperative may allow the farmer to expand his operation. 
Similarly, if a producer desires to maintain the size of his 
operation but reduce the amount of labor which he has to 
provide, the cooperative may be the answer. 
Contracting is often not viewed favorably by farmers . 
With contracting farmers usually lose some degree of control 
over the decision making for their operation. Some critics of 
contracting argue that farmers on contract simply become hired 
hands on their own land for large corporations. Contracting 
with the management cooperative will tend to alleviate this 
problem associated with contracting. Since a cooperative is a 
user-owned and controlled business, farmers contracting with 
the cooperative will have some voice in the decision making 
for the cooperative. Farmers will be required to perform as 
the contract specifies but they will also have some policy 
control through their ability to vote and elect a board of 
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directors who, in turn, determine how the cooperative is 
operated. 
Another major criticism of contracting is that farmers do 
not receive enough return to cover their labor costs and 
building expenses (Robbins, 1988). Contracting with the 
cooperative will also tend to eliminate this problem. The 
management cooperative may use the same contract form as 
others used in the industry, but because it is a cooperative 
farmers are entitled to a share of the cooperative's profits 
through patronage refunds. If a farmer contracts with a large 
corporation any prof its that are realized by the corporation 
may leave the community and go to the corporate shareholders 
or they may be invested by the corporation in other areas 
outside of swine production. If that same farmer contracts 
with a cooperative and the cooperative realizes prof its then 
either the profits will be returned to the farmer or they will 
be retained by the cooperative which will serve to benefit the 
local community. 
While there are some criticisms against contracting, 
farmers who are actively involved in contracting generally 
have a positive attitude towards it. In V. James Rhodes' 
study (1990b) growers rated their satisfaction with 
contracting at an average of 4.5 on a 6 point scale (6 = 
extremely satisfied and 1 = not satisfied at all). In that 
same study independents who were not involved in contracting 
had a more negative view of contracting. Of those 
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independents not involved in contracting only 1% were 
considering the idea and only another 20% said they might 
consider it sometime (Rhodes, 1990b) . This indicates that 
farmers are generally opposed to contracting until they 
actually produce hogs under contract and recognize its 
advantages. 
Cooperative objectives 
The swine management cooperative's objective is more than 
just to supply management services to swine producers. The 
primary objective for the formation of this type of 
cooperative is to increase the performance and efficiency of 
Iowa swine producers so that Iowa can maintain its competitive 
advantage in the production of pork. Some specific objectives 
or goals for the formation of swine management cooperatives 
include: 
1. To improve the utility or well-being (income) of a 
farmer who desires to be involved in swine 
production. This is the fundamental purpose of a 
cooperative (Cobia, 1989). 
2. To provide farmers or other indiv iduals with 
additional labor and/or resources available with the 
opportunity to diversify their present operation to 
make a profit in the swine industry without 
requiring extensive knowledge or managerial 
experience. The cooperative will also allow 
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producers to expand their operation due to the 
reduced time required to perform managerial 
obligations. 
3. To provide the managerial services listed above to 
swine farmers that otherwise would not be available. 
Some of these services, such as a consulting 
veterinarian, would be available without the 
cooperative but may be prohibitively expensive for 
the individual producer to purchase this service on 
his or her own. 
4. To coordinate the sale of market hogs to obtain a 
higher price than individual farmers would be able 
to. In addition, the cooperative could provide 
inputs such as feed or veterinary supplies to the 
farmer-members at lower input prices than individual 
farmers might be able to obtain on their own. 
5. To increase the efficiency of markets through 
improved coordination between producers and 
consumers such as encouraging the production of a 
certain type or quality of hog. 
6. To encourage the construction and utilization of 
standardized faciltiies for profitable and efficient 
swine production. Through the development of 
standardized building designs the cooperative will 
be more able to identify the cause of problems in an 
individual building by comparing it to other 
7. 
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basically identical buildings. 
To reduce and share producer risk by offering the 
farmers a guaranteed return under contracting. The 
producer still faces some production risks. 
However, the price and production risk for the 
individual farmer-members are pooled and accepted by 
the cooperative. 
8. To provide financing to swine farmers for buildings 
and equipment if they are unable to obtain financing 
elsewhere. 
9 . To serve as a production standard and provide a 
measure of how a profitable and efficient swine 
operation should perform for comparison to other 
forms of swine operations. 
10. Establish a competitive contract market for contract 
provisions. The cooperative could affect payment 
schedules, incentive structures, and other practices 
thereby preventing potential abuse. This is known 
as the "competitive yardstick" role of cooperatives 
(Cobia, 1989). 
Objectives 
The objective of this research is to study the 
feasibility of a cooperative providing management services to 
Iowa swine producers. This question will be analyzed in terms 
of the cooperative's return, farmer-members' returns, and risk 
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levels. This thesis will focus on the following five 
objectives: 
1. Determine the optimal membership structure for the 
cooperative. Some specific questions include: What 
is the optimal membership size for the cooperative? 
Should membership be composed of specialized swine 
producers or swine producers with diversified swine 
and crop farms or some combination of the two? What 
mix of farrow-to-finish, feeder pig finishing, and 
feeder pig production is best for the cooperative? 
Should the cooperative be composed of small, medium, 
or large-sized swine farms or some mixture of all 
three? 
2. Determine the effect increased levels of management 
has on swine performance measures such as 
litters/sow/ year, pigs weaned/ litter, death loss, 
feed efficiency, and labor requirements. Do 
different levels of management produce different 
results? 
3. Determine the effects on membership, cooperative 
returns, member returns, and risk levels that 
various contract styles might have. Are there some 
contract structures which are better suited to the 
cooperative? 
4. Determine if there are advantages to the cooperative 
in providing financing to farmer-members for 
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facilities or whether members should obtain their 
own financing. 
5. Determine how the cooperative's earnings might be 
distributed to members. 
overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides 
a review of the theory related to cooperatives and similar 
business forms and shows how the theory relates to the problem 
being addressed. Chapter III includes an explanation of the 
model and the analytical procedures used. Chapter IV presents 
and interprets the results from the model. Chapter V includes 
a summary, conclusions, and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
There is an abundance of material that has been written 
on the subject of agricultural cooperatives. However, most of 
it has been described as descriptive, eulogistic, and lacking 
in theoretical content (LeVay, 1983). Cooperative theory that 
addresses management cooperatives is virtually nonexistent. 
The cooperative form of business resembles other business 
forms such as participatory and labor-managed firms. The 
inclusion of this theoretical literature has contributed to 
the development of a complete and comprehensive theoretical 
model for the management cooperativ e used in this research 
study. 
Definitions 
Cooperatives 
Cooperatives have traditionally been defined as 
businesses that are owned by their patrons and follow the 
Rochdale principles (Staatz, 1987b). The Rochdale principles 
include: (1) net margins distributed according to patronage; 
(2) democratic control--one-member, one-vote; (3) limited 
return on stock; (4) limitation on the number of shares owned; 
(5) open membership; (6) trading on a cash basis; (7) 
membership education in the cooperative way of doing business; 
(8) political and religious neutrality; (9) no unusual risk 
assumption; and (10) goods sold at regular retail prices, with 
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net margins rebated to members, rather than discounted retail 
prices. 
After reviewing these principles it becomes obvious that 
no cooperative in the 1990's will follow all of them. 
Variations in practices make a concise definition extremely 
difficult to state. However, due to the modern legal and tax 
structure and the standards which have been set forth in the 
Capper-Volstead Act, agricultural cooperatives tend to be 
limited in the practices they follow. Perhaps the best 
definition of a cooperative is "a user-owned and controlled 
business from which benefits are derived and distributed 
equitably on the basis of use" (USDA, 1987, p. ii). 
A review of the literature on cooperative theory shows 
that cooperatives are related to participatory and labor-
managed firms. While these other two business forms are not 
exactly the same as cooperatives, they do show many 
similarities which can be applied to the theory of 
cooperatives. 
Participatory firm 
A participatory firm is a firm where decision making is 
not done on an individual basis, but where decision making is 
done in groups. The reason for the development of a business 
form where different groups jointly determine company policy 
is that employee participation in management increases worker 
productivity. The workers feel that the success of the 
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company depends on their decisions {Svejnar, 1982). The 
ownership of assets in a participatory firm is usually the 
same as in a prof it-maximizing firm (PMF) where the 
stockholders or owners own and control the assets. Workers in 
a participatory firm enjoy the usufruct of the assets but do 
not own them. Usufruct rights are the rights to use and 
benefit from an asset (Minkler, 1989). The participatory firm 
is related to a cooperative because the employees of the firm 
are actively involved in the decision making process and in an 
agricultural cooperative the members can influence decision 
making through their vote of who serves on the board of 
directors. 
Labor-managed firm 
A labor-managed firm (LMF) also closely resembles a 
cooperative. A LMF is a firm where all laborers participate 
in decision making (Vanek, 1970). Members of a LMF are also 
able to enjoy the usufruct of the assets. The LMF goes one 
step farther than the participatory firm in that members of 
the LMF share in the residual income (Minkler, 1989). This is 
a similar practice that is followed in a cooperative business 
where the members share in any residual income through the 
distribution of retained earnings. Ownership of assets in a 
LMF can be by its workers or by outside investors. 
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Relationship of firms 
These three business forms are related to each other and 
can be depicted as on a continuum (Fusfeld, 1983). On one end 
of the continuum is the capitalist firm or PMF. In a PMF the 
authority to make decisions is exercised exclusively by the 
owners. The next stage on the continuum is the participatory 
firm. In the participatory firm workers are given some of the 
decision making authority and they take on some of the 
functions and responsibilities of management. Participatory 
firms can usually be identified as having either "quality 
circles" or employee stock ownership plans (Fusfeld, 1983). 
The final firm on the continuum is the LMF where workers 
control decision making throughout the entire managerial 
hierarchy. The cooperative form of business most closely 
resembles the LMF. Sexton (1984) argues that LMFs are closely 
analogous to agricultural cooperatives . LMF theorists have 
developed models that are very closely comparable to the 
models developed by farm cooperative theorists. Meade (1972) 
also refers to LMFs as cooperatives. 
In the rest of this chapter, LMFs, participatory firms, 
and cooperatives will be viewed as identical business forms. 
Objective of the Cooperative 
The issue of defining the objective of a cooperative form 
of business has received much attention and has been addressed 
by several theorists. There is no overall general consensus 
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on what the objective of a cooperative should be. However, 
the most commonly found objective in cooperative literature is 
that of maximization of income per member or per laborer 
(Ward, 1958; Vanek, 1970; Ladd, 1982). The rationale behind 
this objective is simple - everyone engaged in a cooperative 
or collective effort is naturally interested in receiving, 
subject to some predetermined rules for income sharing, the 
maximum reward for his efforts (Vanek, 1970). This objective 
is expanded by Kahana and Nitzan (1989) to include some other 
less quantifiable variables such as the level of unemployment, 
participation in community affairs, intangible income, 
perceptions of the manager's performance, and the employment 
stability for the members. In an empirical test of a plywood 
cooperative Berman and Berman (1989) concluded that there are 
no deductive reasons for a cooperative to act differently from 
a PMF if it maximizes income per member . Kahana (1989) also 
comes to the conclusion that a LMF with a fixed number of 
members will maximize profit, the same as that of a PMF. 
There have been several other objectives for cooperatives 
that have evolved from efforts to more precisely understand 
how the cooperative association works. Ireland (1987) argues 
that the utility of the members is maximized when the return 
per hour worked is maximized. This is a comparable objective 
to the one proposed by Ward, Vanek, and Ladd except that it is 
based on return per hour worked, instead of return per 
laborer. Another less quantifiable objective suggested by 
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Stephen (1982) is that the cooperative objective is to 
maximize member utility. He includes dividend payment, number 
of laborers, and total hours worked in his definition of 
member utility. Maximization of laborer utility subject to 
some minimum revenue constraint is another objective that has 
been analyzed (Neary, 1988). 
The objective which has received the most analysis and 
has been accepted by the most theorists is the maximization of 
income per member. This objective is easily quantified and 
causes the behavior of cooperatives to be similar to a PMF. 
Equilibrium and Resource Allocation 
Equilibrium 
Since a cooperative is owned by its user-members, a key 
issue in determining if a cooperative is a viable business 
form is whether or not it is efficient in its resource use and 
allocation. Vanek (1969), Furubotn (1976), and Ireland and 
Law (1982) support the hypothesis that a cooperative will 
behave in the same manner as a PMF and will produce the 
maximum output possible from a given set of resources as well 
as maximum social satisfaction from a predetermined 
distribution of income. This holds in the short-run as well 
as the long- run where both a cooperative and a PMF will lead 
to the same Pareto-optimal equilibrium solutions (Meade, 
1972). It is crucial that a cooperative be as efficient as 
any other business form if it is to attract members and 
26 
provide additional benefits not available elsewhere to those 
members. 
cooperative ~irm is smaller 
one difference between the cooperative firm and its 
capitalist counterpart is that the cooperative will tend to 
have lower employment and output (Ward, 1958). The reason 
behind this is that the cooperative behaves just like a PMF 
and uses labor up to the point where the value of marginal 
product of labor equals the wage rate. However, the wage rate 
of cooperative laborers in a worker cooperative will be higher 
because of the distribution of profits through patronage 
refunds to the members, assuming that profits are greater than 
zero. With a declining marginal product of labor this causes 
the cooperative to employ less labor and produce a lower 
output than a PMF (Ben-Ner, 1984a). Bonin and Futterman 
(1986) also come to the same result that cooperatives will be 
smaller than capitalist firms when profits are positive. 
Another reason for the cooperative being smaller than a 
similar PMF is because of the subsidiarity principle. The 
subsidiarity principle states that decision making is done 
best in small groups (Vanek, 1970) . Since all members of the 
cooperative participate in the decision making process it will 
be advantageous for the cooperative to be smaller than a PMF. 
There are, however, exceptions to the cooperative being 
smaller in size. Kahana and Nitzan (1989) found that a 
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cooperative with an objective of maximization of income per 
member subject to a constraint on the number of members, or an 
objective of maximum employment subject to a profit per member 
constraint, would actually hire more labor than a traditional 
cooperative and possibly more than a PMF. It is also possible 
under price uncertainy and inflation that a cooperative will 
produce more than a PMF (Paroush and Kahana, 1980). 
The argument for the cooperative being smaller than its 
capitalist counterpart may not apply to this analysis. In the 
swine management cooperative the laborers will tend to be paid 
the same as laborers in similar PMFs and, since the members 
receive the patronage refunds and not the laborers, the 
cooperative will tend to produce a similar level of output as 
other firms in the industry. The level of output for the 
swine management cooperative will also depend on whether or 
not it has a limit on the maximum number of farmer-members. 
Capital intensity 
Another significant difference between cooperatives and 
PMFs is their use of capital. If there was a cooperative with 
a level of capital equal to a PMF, the cooperative would have 
a higher capital/ member ratio than the PMF, because a 
cooperative will tend to employ fewer members than the PMF 
{Steinherr, 1978). In their empirical test of plywood 
cooperatives Berman and Berman (1989) found that cooperatives 
do tend to have higher capital/ member ratios. This tends to 
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suggest that the swine management cooperative will be more 
attracted towards highly capital intensive swine operations. 
Resource allocation 
Resource allocation is another issue which needs to be 
addressed in comparing the efficiency of cooperatives and 
PMFs. If there are multiple firms within an industry with 
different technologies between firms, then inefficiencies in 
resource allocation will occur because the marginal value 
products of inputs among firms will not be equal (Vanek, 
1970) . Despite the inequality of marginal value products, the 
cooperative firm will still operate at a point of maximum 
factor productivities (Vanek, 1969). Even though an industry 
may not be efficient in its resource allocation, the 
cooperative firms within that industry will use their 
resources efficiently. Furubotn {1976) argues that with 
uncertainty resource allocation may not be Pareto-optimal. 
The empirical test conducted by Berman and Berman (1989) 
showed no misallocation of labor. Most evidence indicates 
that cooperatives are efficient in their allocation of 
resources. 
Financing Cooperatives 
Financing is another important issue in determining the 
success of a cooperative. Improper financing can affect the 
way members perceive and use the cooperative. There are three 
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methods which a cooperative can use to finance its assets and 
operations: external financing, renting or leasing, or 
through internal financing. 
The original argument presented by Vanek (1977) supported 
the use of external financing for cooperatives. His reasoning 
was that external financing would reduce the likelihood that 
the members would get into disagreements while they were 
making financing decisions. Also, external financing would 
prevent the current members from dissolving the firm to 
obtain quick money for themselves. There is one major 
disadvantage with external financing. Since this is a 
cooperative, the external creditors have limited control over 
the management of the firm. Therefore, it is difficult and 
costly for cooperatives to encourage outside investors to 
fully finance a cooperative (Futterman, 1984). 
Jensen and Meckling (1979) proposed that for Pareto-
optimality the cooperative should be a pure-rental firm. The 
one major flaw of a pure-rental firm is that intangible 
assets, such as research and development, cannot be rented. 
If intangible assets are to be obtained they have to be 
financed either through personal contributions of workers or 
through a bond or stock issue (Futterman, 1984). 
The final method of financing is through internal 
financing. Apart from the fact that with internal financing 
members can dissolve and eliminate the firm, internal 
financing does represent the members commitment and belief 
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that the cooperative will succeed. However, it is irrational 
to think that members can provide all of the money to operate 
a cooperative business. 
Uvalic {1986) showed that when a loan repayment period is 
shorter than or equal to the workers' time horizon, any 
investment must be seen as a combination of internal and 
external financing. This is obvious because if an asset will 
pay for itself before the average member stops patronizing the 
cooperative, then the members will be willing to invest in the 
asset. However, members should not invest 100 percent of the 
money because this would lead members to try to get the most 
out of their money at any expense to the cooperative. McBride 
(1986, p. 147) gives a rule of thumb measurement that the 
"amount of inital capital that should be provided by members 
is 50 percent of the amount needed to finance fixed assets and 
for the first year's operating requirements." The best 
financing strategy for a cooperative is a mixture of internal 
and external financing. 
Cooperative Advantages and Benefits 
Farmers have chosen to organize and patronize 
agricultural cooperatives in the United States for over 200 
years even though there are proprietorships, partnerships, and 
corporate forms of business that provide the same service as 
cooperatives (Cobia, 1989). The primary motivation for farmer 
participation in cooperatives is to improve their well-being 
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or income (Cobia, 1989). The source of the reasoning behind 
this motivation is all the advantages that cooperatives have 
to offer their members. There are several advantages of a 
cooperative providing management services and engaged in 
contracting with farmers verses a PMF engaged in contracting 
with the farmer. 
Broader scope for optimization 
One advantage a cooperative has over an investor-owned 
firm (!OF) in providing management-type services is that the 
cooperative will tend to have a potentially broader scope for 
optimization (Staatz, 1987b). The cooperative and the farmer 
are vertically integrated due to the legal contract between 
them. The farmer-members are going to be interested in 
maximizing the performance of the combination of the farm and 
the cooperative, not in treating them as separate entities 
because the farmer-members benefit when the cooperative is 
prosperous. 
The broader scope for optimization of the cooperative is 
supported due to the cooperative's view of the asset fixity of 
the farmer-members. In order for the farmer to become 
involved with the cooperative a set of buildings, equipment, 
and machinery are needed. Regardless of whether these items 
are financed by a bank or the cooperative, they represent a 
fixed cost to the farmer. An IOF is not going to be concerned 
about these fixed costs. This is evidenced in v. James Rhodes 
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(1990b) paper on contract hog production where 89% of the 
producers raising hog under contract said they could maintain 
their buildings but only 36% said they were receiving enough 
to replace their buildings. However, a cooperative, due to 
its integrated structure, will take into account the farmer-
members' fixed costs when making decisions and setting 
payments to farmers. For an IOF these fixed costs become 
variable costs in that an IOF views the contract payment to a 
farmer as a variable cost, not as a payment to the farmer for 
his investment in fixed assets (Staatz, 1987b). 
An IOF is not concerned if it deals with a particular 
farmer on a year-to-year basis. In contrast, the cooperative 
would be interested in a longer-term commitment with its 
members. The cooperative will put more emphasis on providing 
a farmer-member with a market for his labor and effort because 
the cooperative takes into account the member's need to 
amortize their fixed investments (Staatz, 1987b). 
For the cooperative to take advantage of its broader 
scope for optimization it is necessary that the activities of 
the farmer-member and the cooperative are coordinated as 
closely as possible. Coordination may be difficult or reduced 
if the membership is highly heterogeneous (Staatz, 1987b). 
The membership of the management cooperative will tend to be 
of a homogeneous nature. The membership is homogeneous in 
that all the members who patronize the cooperative are going 
to be swine producers who are interested in capitalizing on 
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the increased management provided by the cooperative. The 
management cooperative should be able to capitalize on the 
advantages of its broader scope for optimization because the 
membership will tend to be more homogeneous than a cooperative 
that services more than just swine farmers. 
Gain from coordination 
Another advantage of this cooperative will be in its gain 
from coordination in input and output markets. If, as is 
usual in contracting situations, the cooperative owns the hogs 
and if there are several farmers who are contracting with the 
cooperative, it will have to purchase either breeding stock or 
feeder animals. Because the cooperative will be dealing with 
such large quantities of hogs, it will be able to bargain to 
get volume discounts which will lead to more profits for the 
cooperative and subsequently its farmer-members. The 
cooperative will also have this bargaining power if it is 
supplying feed, veterinary supplies, and other supples to the 
individual operations. The cooperative will be able to 
coordinate the sale of animals as well. It will be able to 
combine animals for sale of similar kind and quality to 
receive higher prices at slaughtering plants. There will be 
additional benefits from coordination if some of the 
cooperative's patrons are feeder pig producers and others are 
feeder pig finishers. 
Cooperatives generally have not exploited the potential 
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that can be realized from the coordination of farmers' and 
cooperatives' actions (Cobia, 1989). This has been due to the 
decrease in decision making that the farmer must accept if the 
gains from coordination are to be captured by the cooperative. 
It will be necessary for the management cooperative to provide 
the farmer with an attractive offer to induce him to join and 
patronize if these benefits from coordination are going to be 
profited upon. 
By coordinating the activities of several farmers, the 
management cooperative will be able to realize efficiencies 
that otherwise would be unavailable to the members. These 
efficiencies are represented in game-theoretic terms by 
superadditivity of the characteristic function and 
subadditivity of the cost function (Staatz, 1987a). 
superadditivity and subadditivity 
Superadditivity of the characteristic function implies 
that the cooperative, as a group of farmer-members, will 
receive a higher level of payoff than can the summation of 
disjoint subgroups of two or more farmer-members that in total 
include all of the farmer-members in the cooperative (Staatz, 
1987a). This doesn't ensure that the farmer-members and the 
cooperative will work together, however. For these two groups 
to work together their individual returns must be greater than 
either one could acheive independently. If the cooperative 
keeps all the additional profits received from superadditivity 
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to itself, then the members have no incentive to remain with 
the cooperative. 
subadditivity of the cost function implies that it is 
cheaper for the cooperative to provide services to multiple 
groups of members than to provide the service to each group 
individually. Subadditivity is not synonymous with economies 
of scale. Subadditivity of the cost function makes providing 
the service to all cooperative members less expensive than 
providing the service to individual groups (Staatz, 1987a). 
The subadditive cost function can be illustrated with an 
example based on the swine management cooperative being 
discussed. The membership will be somewhat heterogeneous in 
that there are feeder pig producers, feeder pig finishers, and 
farrow-to-finish stage of production groups. If the 
cooperative would provide services to one of these groups 
only, there would be gains realized due to coordination 
regardless of which group would be choosen. If the 
cooperative was composed of two groups, such as feeder pig 
finishers and farrow-to-finish operators, then there would be 
additional gains and cost efficiencies from the sale of the 
market hogs because the two groups could market their hogs 
together. There would also be cost efficiencies from the 
purchasing of inputs for both groups combined. In this 
instance the cost of providing services to both groups would 
be less than the sum if the two groups were operated 
independently. This same analogy would apply if the 
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cooperative would have producers from all three stage of 
production groups where there would be joint benefits and 
gains from having all three groups in a single management 
cooperative. 
This analysis also brings up the subject of cost 
allocation. Subadditivity due to having all three production 
stage groups in the cooperative doesn't necessarily mean that 
costs should be distributed equally t o each group. If this 
were done, it may be possible for the feeder pig producers and 
the feeder pig finishers to separate from the cooperative and 
form their own coalition at a lower cost, for example. If the 
cooperative is going to achieve the benefits from 
subadditivity it must allocate costs such that there are no 
incentives for any group or combination of groups to leave the 
cooperative (Staatz, 1987a). It is vital that there are 
benefits for all groups of members to stay with the 
cooperative . 
Risk pooling 
Risk pooling is one of the objectives for forming 
cooperatives. Risk pooling and risk sharing are inherent in 
cooperatives because of the sharing of profits through 
patronage refunds (Cobia, 1989). Kimball (1988) demonstrated 
that cooperatives can provide substantial risk insurance to 
its members even when the cooperative itself has a low level 
of risk aversion. 
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The swine management cooperative will provide risk 
reduction to the farmer-members from the contract, in addition 
to risk pooling and sharing. By contracting with the 
cooperative individual producers will be able to reduce their 
price risks and will only have production risks to face. 
Economic performance of cooperatives 
Cooperative businesses potentially have an economic 
advantage over PMFs or IOFs because the members are the owners 
and they participate in the decision making. Steinherr (1977) 
found that a firm with a given set of resources and a given 
number of laborers attains the highest output possible when 
the workers participate in decision making and when there are 
profit-sharing plans. His results don't show complete laborer 
participation or profit-sharing, only that some positive level 
of participation and profit-sharing are optimal. Worker 
cooperatives have laborer participation in decision making and 
profit-sharing through patronage refunds. Estrin et al. 
(1987) also agrees that some worker participation has positive 
effects on productivity. Conte and Svejnar (1988) found that 
firms with worker participation in decision making are 
approximately 46 percent more productive than firms without 
such schemes, ceteris paribus. Workers are exposed to 
additional information about the company if they are actively 
involved in decision making and this results in increased 
worker utility and profit (Manning, 1989). 
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Viable alternative for family farmers 
The cooperative may also be able to address the issue of 
the declining number of family farms in recent years. Trends 
in the past twenty years show that the number of farms in the 
United States has been decreasing which has been offset by an 
increase in average farm size. This has been coupled with the 
fact that a greater share of gross farm income has been going 
to larger farms (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1979). A 
1979 report to the Congress of the United States says 
" . .. independent family farmers need the right to act together 
through cooperatives if many are to survive in today's highly 
concentrated agricultural structure" (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 1979, p . 4). Cooperatives are a viable alternative 
available for family farmers in helping them survive as 
agriculture becomes more competive. Cooperatives will be able 
to help the survival of the family farm by offering healthy 
competition to profit-type corporations (Roy, 1976). 
Cooperatives have been repositioning themselves in 
recessionary times by instituting additional practices to 
reinforce operations (Swanson, 1987). Two of the adapted or 
modified practices listed by Swanson (1987) will be provided 
by the swine management cooperative: providing financial 
assistance or financial consulting to members and providing 
record keeping services for members. Dunn et al. (1988, p. 
10) also argues that "cooperatives remain the single most 
effective way farmers can improve their economic circumstances 
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and will continue to play a significant role in the U.S. food 
and fiber sector." 
Additional benefits 
In a cooperative business there is no separation between 
those who control the cooperative and those who earn the 
profits (Vanek, 1971). This reduces conflicts which 
frequently occur in business between managers and workers. 
This also increases productivity because there is no conflict 
of interest between manager and worker goals (Fusfeld, 1983). 
Members of a cooperative have incentives to work harder 
because any additional profit generated by increased effort 
accrues to the firm as a whole and then to the individual 
members (Meade, 1972). Members have a genuine, not imposed, 
motivation to work more productively and efficiently which 
leads to better quality and quality control (Vanek, 1971) . 
However, some members in a cooperative may be motivated to 
shirk and cheat rather than to work harder. These problems 
deal with moral hazard and are addressed later in this 
chapter. 
The members' involvement in decision making through their 
ability to vote gives them a greater degree of internal unity 
with their cooperative involvement which affects the day-to-
day operations (Ireland and Law, 1988). Members are less 
alienated due to their involvement in decision making. 
Minkler (1989) pointed out that this involvement in decision 
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making is a benefit to the members because they set their own 
level of monitoring and incentives to work. 
The involvement of members in decision making leads to 
better flows of information which leads to innovation at the 
point of production because members have more information than 
employers or managers (Ireland, 1987). Cooperatives are 
highly efficient organizations for communication and are able 
to utilize knowledge about production that is generally not 
available in PMFs or IOFs. 
Cooperatives are also more apt to invest in the training 
and education of their members because the benefits of 
additional training accrue to the cooperative (Vanek, 1970). 
Due to their organizational form, cooperatives may also 
be able to get certain tax exemptions and have access to loans 
at below-market rates of interest (Porter, 1987). 
Cooperative Disadvantages and Problems 
Just as there are many advantages of cooperatives that 
attract members to them there are also many disadvantages. 
Cooperative business forms have imperfections because of the 
way they are organized, as do other business forms. 
Laek of cooperatives 
The purpose of organizing a cooperative is to benefit its 
members. Although there are many advantages to belonging to a 
cooperative, there are still many farmers who don't patronize 
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them. In 1985 farmers purchased only 26% of their farm 
supplies and marketed only 28% of their products through 
agricultural cooperatives (Cobia, 1989). This suggests that 
the apparent advantages of cooperatives are not well 
understood or explored by farmers. This observation is 
supported by Rooney (1988) who found in a study of employee-
owned firms that there was very little participation in 
decision making in those firms. 
Jensen and Meckling (1979) determined that members don't 
value security or participation in management at more than the 
cost of providing them. There are costs of having the members 
participate in decision making but the benefits of increased 
performance outweigh the costs. Members don't value these 
benefits as much as the costs and consequently participation 
is not readily observed (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
Underinvestment is given as a reason for the lack of 
cooperatives by Vanek (1977). Meade (1972) proposes two 
reasons why the cooperative organization is not more common. 
The first is that the cooperative organization may not have 
the discipline to ensure efficient operation if the 
cooperative is comprised of a very large number of members. 
The second reason is that property owners can diversify their 
risks by investing in many assets but workers in a producer 
cooperative cannot put small amounts of effort into differing 
jobs and hence, they cannot diversify their risks. This is 
one of the reasons why capital hires labor rather than labor 
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hires capital because labor cannot diversify its risk into 
many different jobs. 
While there may appear to be a lack of cooperatives in 
agriculture today, they do in fact provide a significant share 
of the total business to farmers. 
More diffuse scope for optimization 
A cooperative has a more diffuse scope for optimization 
which comes from decisions regarding the pricing of its goods 
and services and on allocating costs (Staatz, 1987b). This 
characteristic is similar to the cooperative's broader scope 
for optimization, but also serves as a disadvantage. 
Optimization in a cooperative is more diffuse because the 
returns are distributed according to patronage and the 
cooperative has a separate locus for profit maximization for 
each member (Staatz, 1987b). As a result, price setting tends 
to be more costly in a cooperative as compared to an IOF due 
to the members involvement in decision making and the 
difficulty in reaching a consensus. Each and every member has 
a different view on how the cooperative should be operated as 
compared to the management which is working for a common 
purpose. This is the reason why most decisions in a 
cooperative are left up to the board of directors and the 
managers. In an IOF decisions on pricing are usually left up 
to management and not decided upon by the stockholders or 
members. 
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Vanek (1971) also points out that collective decision 
making results in slower decision making. Another reason for 
difficult decision making is that members in a cooperative 
often lack the appropriate expertise for decision making in 
areas such as finance, marketing, and research (Estrin et al., 
1987). 
Expansion into new markets 
A cooperative's ability to expand into new markets or 
increase market share in existing markets is limited by its 
cost allocation procedures. In order to enter a new market or 
gain market share i t is often necessary to reduce prices below 
costs. Since a cooperative operates at cost (including normal 
profits) reducing prices will result in subsidization of the 
new or expanding market by the existing market (Staatz, 
1987b). These subsidies must be financed for the new members 
at the expense of the existing members. The existing members 
will likely object to proposals to enter into new areas or 
gain additional market share in existing areas. It may also 
explain why cooperatives generally have a more narrow focus of 
activities as compared to an IOF (Staatz, 1987b). 
Lack of a market for cooperative stock 
When members join a cooperative, they are required to 
provide equity in the form of cooperative stock. Unlike an 
IOF in which a stockholder has a residual claim on the 
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earnings of the firm as long as the person owns the stock, a 
cooperative stockholder only receives these residual claims to 
the earnings if he or she continues to patronize the 
cooperative. After a farmer-member discontinues patronizing 
the firm, he or she no longer has a residual claim on the 
earnings and, depending on the cooperative's equity redemption 
program, may receive his or her original investment paid back 
in nominal value over a period of years (Staatz, 1987b). 
Another difference between the stock of a cooperative and 
an IOF, is that the value of the cooperative members' stock 
does not change with changes in the expected present value of 
the firm's future earnings. This is caused by an absence of a 
secondary market for cooperative stock which prevents farmer-
members from realizing the full value of the expected present 
value of the future earnings stream (Staatz, 1987b). 
The lack of a secondary market for cooperative stock 
poses some other problems also. In organizations with 
tradeable stock, the market price of the stock serves to 
monitor the performance of the managers in the organization 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979). The nonmarketable feature of 
cooperative stock also means that members are unable to 
diversify their portfolios across different firms and 
different assets (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). 
Horizon problem 
Because members' residual claims on earnings are only 
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available if the member patronizes the cooperative and because 
of the absence of a secondary market for the stock, 
cooperative farmer-members receive almost all of their 
benefits of ownership through current patronage. This causes 
members to pressure the cooperative to place a higher value on 
current earnings, as opposed to future earnings. Members 
would rather receive current earnings from patronage than to 
have the cooperative make long-term investments which will 
produce benefits after the current members have retired. This 
tendency to emphasize current cash flow at the expense of 
future earnings has been labeled the "horizon problem" (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1979). 
The horizon problem may be more serious if a cooperative 
has any of the following characteristics: (1) large per-
member capital investment, (2) closed membership, (3) few 
legally incorporated member firms, (4) prohibition of the 
intergenerational transfer of membership, or (5) a large, 
diverse membership (Staatz, 1987b). 
A large investment by a member may increase the tendency 
to get a high current return. If a cooperative has a closed 
membership, then there are no benefits for the farmer-member 
to be concerned about the long-run viability of the 
cooperative because his cooperative membership can't be 
transferred to the next generation or capitalized into the 
value of his farm if he would sell. A legal corporate member 
will put more emphasis on the future earning ability of the 
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cooperative because the membership automatically stays with 
the corporation even though its owners may change over the 
years. This same analogy holds for the transfer of 
memberships between family gererations. A cooperative with a 
large, diverse membership may have more difficulties with the 
horizon problem than a small cooperative with strong ties 
between its members. 
The swine management cooperative may be able to attenuate 
the horizon problem by avoiding some of the above 
characteristics. The cooperative would easily be able to do 
this by allowing open membership and the transfer of 
membership between generations. The cooperative will have a 
fairly homogenous membership. The number of corporate members 
patronizing the cooperative and the per-member capital 
investment may provide problems but these should easily be 
reduced to a manageable level through the use of debt 
financing. 
Horizon problems are not restricted to cooperatives. The 
investment decisions of PMFs are also affected by problems 
related to limited time horizons for two reasons (Ireland, 
1987). The first reason is that market uncertainty may cause 
a firm to use a short pay-back criteria when evaluating 
investment possibilities when actually a project may have 
large far-off returns. Secondly, firms that have short-term 
wage contracts may be in a poor bargaining position with 
unions if they are locked into long-term investment projects. 
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These two factors show that cooperatives are no more 
disadvantaged due to the horizon problem, when compared to 
PMFs (Ireland, 1987). 
One way in which the horizon problem can be reduced is 
for the cooperative to pursue goals of growth and expansion 
(Staatz, 1987b). In this way the management helps to protect 
the cooperative's long-run potential. 
Principal-agent problems 
An agency relationship is defined as a "contract under 
which one or more persons (the principals) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent" (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308). In the 
management cooperative the agent can be thought of as the 
manager of the cooperative or the cooperative itself and the 
principals are the farmer-members. The manager of the 
cooperative works for the farmer-members because they own the 
cooperative. The manager is also responsible for the 
developing of the contract which determines how and what 
amount the farmer-members receive for their contributions of 
labor and effort to the cooperative . Agency theory problems 
develop because the agent may not always act in the best 
interest of the utility-maximizing principals. 
An organization can be thought of as a connected group of 
contracts which specify relationships among individuals 
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(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). With other business forms, 
including cooperatives, when principals and agents enter into 
contract agreements any gain achieved by the agent in 
developing the contract is done at the expense of the 
principal. These gains are kept with the agent and 
distributed to the stockholders or owners depending on the 
form of the business. With the cooperative the situation is 
the same in that any gains attained by the agent (cooperative) 
are done at the expense of the principals (farmer-members). 
Because this is a cooperative form of business the farmer-
members own the cooperative and any profits produced by the 
cooperative are paid back to the members in the form of 
patronage refunds or else reinvested back into the cooperative 
which indirectly benefits its members. This is not meant to 
suggest that agency problems will be nonexistent in the 
management cooperative, only that they may be of less 
significance than with other business forms engaged in 
contracting. 
Agency problems are still going to be present because the 
contracts between the farmer-members and the cooperative will 
not be costless to write and enforce (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
There is going to be friction in writing the contract between 
the manager of the cooperative and the farmer-members. In 
order for the management cooperative to be successful in 
reaching its goals, the contracts must be specific. The 
contract will need to clearly state the cooperative's 
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responsibility for such items as developing rations, supplying 
pigs and other inputs, veterinary programs, payments and 
incentive payments to the farmer. The contract must also 
specify the farmer-member's responsibility for production 
practices and the expected efficiency levels. In addition to 
developing the contract, there will also be agency problems 
with enforcing it. The contract will need to include specific 
penalties to ensure enforcement of the agreements between the 
principal and agent. It is essential that there is a method 
of enforcement for both the farmer-member and the cooperative. 
Agency costs reflect the costs of writing and enforcing 
the contracts. These agency costs include monitoring costs of 
the principal, the contracting costs of the agent, and the 
residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since the manager 
and the farmer-members are both utility maximizers there is a 
good chance that the manger will not do what is in the best 
interest of the farmer-members. Consequently, they need to 
provide incentives to the manager and monitior his or her 
activities. One very effective way that the farmer-members 
can indirectly monitor and provide incentives to the manager 
is through the cooperative principle of one-man, one-vote, 
where they can easily vote to replace an ineffective manager. 
The manager will incur costs in developing the contracts so 
that the farmer-members will do what is expected of them and 
to ensure that the farmer-members will be compensated if the 
manager attempts to injure them. Residual loss is a cost 
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incurred because the costs of full enforcement of contracts 
exceeds the benefits. Even after the monitoring and the 
contracting activities, the manager will still not make 
decisions that would maximize the farmer-members utility. 
This reduction in welfare experienced by the members is also a 
residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . 
The theory of agency also addresses problems of residual 
claims. A residual claim is the difference between the 
variable inflows and promised payments to the principals 
(farmer-members). Organizations have contract structures 
which limit the risks taken by the principals by specifying 
fixed payoffs or incentive payoffs tied to specific measures 
of performance (Fama and Jen sen, 1983a) . This was cited 
earlier as one of the reasons farmer-members engage in 
contracting activities, to pool and reduce individual risk. 
For most corporations the stockholders are the residual 
claimants who bear the risk faced by the corporation. They 
accept this risk in exchange for the rights to net cash flows. 
With a cooperative organizational structure this situation is 
somewhat different. In the management cooperative the farmer-
members with whom the cooperative is contracting are also the 
residual claimants. The farmer-members receive the fixed 
payments and/ or the payments tied to measures of performance 
from the contract. They also have the rights to any residual 
earnings of the cooperative because they are the stockholders. 
These residual claims are different from those of 
51 
corporations, as discussed before, because the farmer-member 
is only eligible for these as long as he or she continues to 
patronize the cooperative. 
Separatio n o t ownership and contro l 
The problem of agency relationships where the farmer-
mernber hires the cooperative to provide managerial service s 
leads to another important issue in the theory of 
cooperatives, the separation of ownership and control . This 
problem deals with survival of organizations in which 
important decision makers do not bear a substantial share of 
the wealth effects of their decisions (Fama and Jensen, 
1983b) . The farmer-members and others (debt holders) own the 
cooperative and bear all the risk faced by the cooperative 
whereas the manager is left to make the important decisions . 
In "Separation of Ownership and Control" by Fama and 
Jensen (1983b, p. 308), they argue that "organizations control 
the agency problems that result from separation of decision 
management from residual risk bearing by separating the 
management (initiation and implementation) and control 
(ratification and monitoring) of decisions." 
They divide the decision process into four steps: (1) 
initiation or the generation of proposals, (2) ratification or 
the choice of decisions to be implemented, (3) implementation 
or execution of ratified decisions, and (4) monitoring or the 
measurement of performance and implementation of rewards. 
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There are two main ideas which serve to support this 
hypothesis to control agency problems: (1) specific knowledge 
and diffusing of decisions, and (2) delegation of decision 
control (Fama and Jensen, 1983b} . 
In most organizations, information needed for decision 
control is generally dispersed among several agents. 
Efficient decision control requires delegating decision 
control to whoever has the relevant information and allowing 
someone else to manage these decisions. For example, if the 
cooperative contracts with a veterinarian to oversee the 
health of all the farmer-members' operations, then the 
veterinarian will have the relevant information to make a 
decision if a health problem arises. The manager of the 
cooperative, in this case, only needs to monitor the decisions 
that were made. 
Separation and specialization of decision control and 
residual risk bearing is necessary where there are numerous 
residual claimants who are not qualified for roles in the 
decision process and thus delegate their decision control to 
others. This is a main reason why farmers would join the 
cooperative. Farmers who wish to increase the performance of 
their operation may find that their knowledge is too limited 
to do so. These farmers will join the cooperative so that 
others can make critical decisions for them. The separation 
of risk bearing and decision making allows specialized people 
to perform each job rather a single person where an 
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entrepreneur is both a decision maker and a residual risk 
bearer. With several farmers in the cooperative the benefits 
of separation of decision functions from residual risk bearing 
would be expected to be greater than the agency costs 
generated, including the costs of separating the management 
and control of decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
In an earlier paper Fama (1980) also argues that the 
survival of an organization which is characterized by 
separation of ownership and control is possible with the full 
revision of managerial wages based on past performance. When 
a manager is under contract to perform a specific job and if 
there is no incentive or monitoring, then the manager has an 
incentive to cheat or shirk. Basing a manager's future wage 
on his past performance is an effective monitoring instrument 
and ensures that managerial decisions are made in the best 
interest of the organization's security holders (Fama, 1980) . 
From this analysis it seems to suggest that the swine 
management cooperative with its contracting structure should 
experience fewer difficulties associated with agency problems 
and the separation of ownership and control. 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is a problem that arise when individuals 
engage in risk sharing and when full observation of actions is 
impossible (Holmstrom, 1979). Based on this definition moral 
hazard could easily occur in the swine management cooperative. 
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An example of moral hazard is a swine producer who joins the 
cooperative and knows that he will receive a share of the 
cooperative's profits through patronage refunds. The producer 
might become lax in his production methods because of the 
assurance of the patronage refund and the fact that one 
producer's production contributes little to total cooperative 
profits. If that same producer would become very efficient 
and increase his effort level he would only be able to retain 
a portion of the additional profit generated by his increased 
effort (Meade, 1972). These examples show the effects moral 
hazard could have on productivity for the management 
cooperative. Estrin et al. (1987) adds to this by arguing as 
the number of members in the cooperative increases, each 
individual producer will have a stronger incentive to shirk. 
A remedy to the moral hazard problem is to develop 
methods to monitor the actions of individuals and put members 
under contract (Holmstrom, 1979). By putting cooperative 
members under contract and enforcing penalties if they fail to 
achieve some specified level of performance the problems with 
moral hazard are reduced. 
Tendency to underfinance the cooperative 
There is a tendency in cooperative businesses for them to 
be underfinanced (Vanek, 1977). There are two reasons why 
cooperatives may be underfinanced. 
The first reason is that members of a cooperative will 
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try to increase patronage relative to their investment in a 
cooperative (Staatz, 1987b). When members join a cooperative 
they are required to provide equity capital in order to obtain 
the right to patronize a cooperative. Since a cooperative 
will only return the nominal amount of equity capital invested 
by a member after he discontinues patronage, the only return 
the member receives on his invested money is patronage refunds 
which are based on how much he uses the cooperative. 
Therefore, members of a cooperative will try to patronize the 
business as much as possible based on their investment which 
will tend to cause the cooperative to be underfinanced. 
Another reason for the tendency to underf inance 
cooperatives is the difficulty in raising capital. Capital 
acquisition may be difficult because of the nonrecuperability 
of equity invested in a cooperative (Ellerman, 1986). Members 
who invest in a cooperative will at most get some patronage 
refunds and their initial investment returned to them. In 
addition to this, assets depreciate and need to be replaced 
which further increases the need for capital. The horizon 
problem increases difficulties in raising capital because 
members are reluctant to invest their earnings from 
cooperative profits in long-term investments. Another reason 
for the difficulty in raising capital is due to the common 
property problem whereby new members acquire the same claims 
on cash flows as those members already in a cooperative 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Minkler, 1989). The common 
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property problem causes a disincentive to undertake projects 
with future benefits because those benefits have to be shared 
with new members who didn't initially contribute to the 
project. One solution to this problem might be that new 
members are only allowed into a cooperative based on approval 
from the existing members or board of directors. 
Other disadvantages 
There are two other disadvantages which need to be 
included in this section. The first one is a control problem. 
It is always assumed that members in a cooperative are working 
towards a common objective. However, problems can occur if 
the members are not all interested in pursuing a single 
objective (Jensen and Meckling, 1979). Another problem is 
that cooperatives are excellent for having "small" incentive 
and innovative activity but lack in "medium size'' innovation 
due to the lack of funds for research and development (Vanek, 
1977) . 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed several theoretical lines of 
thought for cooperatives. Several implications can be drawn 
from this theory for the development of a model for the swine 
management cooperative. 
One of the first issues which needs to be addressed is 
defining an acceptable, concise objective for the swine 
57 
management cooperative. The most common objective from the 
literature is the maximization of income per member. For the 
mathematical model which is developed in the next chapter, an 
objective of maximization of cooperative surplus is used. 
Cooperative surplus is defined as: (cooperative income from 
swine operations) - (contract payments to farmer-members) -
(variable costs of supplying managerial services) - (fixed 
costs). 
This objective is essentially the same as maximization of 
income per member because all or part of any cooperative 
surplus will be distributed back to the members. Each 
individual farmer-member's income will consist of contract 
payments plus a percentage of the cooperative surplus that is 
generated. Consequently, the maximization of cooperative 
surplus maximizes per member income. This objective serves a 
dual purpose because it parallels objectives which have been 
developed by cooperative theorists and also allows the 
cooperative to be treated the same as any PMF where the 
objective is simply to maximize profits. 
The theory also establishes the need for determining 
contract structures offered by the cooperative. To avoid most 
moral hazard problems it is essential that the cooperative and 
its farmer-members enter into enforceable legally binding 
contracts. The contracts offered by the cooperative should be 
the same as those offered by other business forms engaged in 
contracting. This is consistent with the Rochdale principle 
58 
which states: "goods sold at regular retail prices, with net 
margins rebated to members, rather than discounted retail 
prices." By offering the same terms to farmers as other 
available contracts in the industry, the swine management 
cooperative will be able to contend competitively against 
other contractors and will also be able to attract members due 
to the cooperative principle of distributing earnings to its 
members through patronage refunds which, in effect, increases 
the value of the terms offered in the cooperative's contract. 
The theory also addresses several other issues which 
affect the day-to-day operations of the cooperative. Farmer-
members who join the cooperative need to purchase stock to 
show their belief and long-term commitment to the cooperative 
and also to provide equity capital for the cooperative. 
The cooperative should be able to avoid problems with 
agency relationships and the separation of ownership and 
control by having some separation between the making and 
monitoring of decisions. Persons who have specific 
information about record keeping or ration formulation or 
health programs need to have the authority to make decisions 
and those decisions need only to be monitored by the 
cooperative manager. For the separation of decision making to 
be effective in controlling agency problems it is also 
essential that the decisions made are coordinated with one 
another. The contracting nature of the cooperative also helps 
to eliminate these problems. 
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The comprehensive theoretical literature review on 
cooperatives has provided insight into several implications on 
the development of a model for the swine management 
cooperative. The next chapter details the development of the 
mathematical model. 
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CHAPTER III. 
MATHEMATICAL MODEL A.ND DATA 
A firm-level mathematical model is used to examine the 
feasibility of a cooperative providing management services to 
swine producers and contracting with its farmer-members. The 
model described in this chapter combines a farm-level 
spreadsheet model with a linear programming model of the 
cooperative. The spreadsheet model is linked with a random 
number generator program to introduce price and production 
risk into the analysis. Figure 3.1 is a schematic diagram of 
the model described in this chapter for the swine management 
cooperative. 
The feasibility of the swine management cooperative is in 
part determined by its need to have several members who are 
willing to enter into_ a contract and produce hogs with the 
cooperative. There are numerous swine farm types with which 
th~ cooperative might contract. An analysis of these farm 
types will determine the activities that are included in the 
cooperative model. 
Swine Parm Activities 
Casual observation of swine farms across the state of 
Iowa will show that no two swine farms are exactly alike. 
They differ by size, stage of production, facility design and 
numerous other characteristics. For this analysis it is 
necessary to limit the swine farm types considered to a number 
building 
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61 
production 
variables 
1 
Random Number Generator 
incorporates risk analysis 
into spreadsheet model 
I 
Firm-level 
spreadsheet model 
other 
inputs 
I 
for a swine farm 
producing hogs under contract 
1 
outputs 
J 
Return to Cooperative 
Return to Farmer-Member 
inputs l constraints 
""' Linear Programming / 
Cooperative Model 
1 
outputs 
l 
Optimal Membership Structure 
Total Cooperative Surplus 
Risk Levels 
Figure 3.1 Schematic d iagram for the cooperative model 
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that can be easily be incorporated into the linear programming 
model. 
Building designs 
swine farm building and equipment designs will generally 
range from capital intensive confinement units to pasture-type 
buildings and equipment. The advantage of one building design 
over another is due to tradeoffs between capital and labor, 
rather than differences in production efficiencies (Curtis, 
1983). Confinement buildings are very capital intensive and 
require the least amount of labor. On the other end of the 
spectrum are pasture buildings and equipment which are 
relatively inexpensive but require larger amounts of labor to 
raise the same number of hogs. Confinement buildings and 
equipment are the most common type in Iowa. 
Some contractors require farmers to modify their building 
designs or build new buildings as a provision of the contract. 
In V. James Rhodes' (1990b) paper on contract hog production 
in the United States, 34 percent of the growers engaged in 
contracting reported that they were required to build or 
change their buildings and equipment in order to obtain a 
contract. The swine management cooperative engaged in 
contracting with its farmer-members will also require the 
modification or the building of new facilities to reach its 
objective of a standardized-type facility. By having all 
farmer-members raising hogs in a standardized building design 
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the cooperative will be more able to identify and resolve 
problems, such as ventilation, in an individual building by 
comparing it to a building standard. 
For the present analysis it is assumed that the swine 
management cooperative will require its farmer-members to all 
have confinement facilities. Since the cooperative will 
require the modification or construction of new buildings it 
would be most practical and beneficial for it to choose the 
most efficient and common design. The limitation to one 
building design for the cooperative also allows for a more 
detailed analysis of the results because data on the 
differences in labor requirements, performance measures, and 
other measurements between building designs are limited. 
Production stages 
There are three production stages included in the 
cooperative model: feeder pig production (FPP), feeder pig 
finishing (FPF), and farrow-to-finish production (FTF). 
Breeding stock producers have not been included in the model. 
It is assumed that breeding stock is purchased from existing 
commercial sources. 
Swine farms in Iowa also vary widely by size. Four 
different sizes of swine operations have been included in the 
model. The operation sizes are defined in Table 3.1 below. 
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Table 3.1 Swine farm sizes used in the cooperative model 
oQeration sizes svmbol no. sows no. Qigs f inishedLyear 
very small v 50 900 
small s 100 1800 
medium M 250 4500 
large L 500 9000 
The three sizes cover a range that includes most Iowa 
swine producers. One of the specific problems faced by the 
cooperative is to choose an optimal mix of enterprise sizes 
and types. 
Contracts 
Example contracts used in the development of the 
cooperative model have been taken from specific contracts 
currently used in the industry. In Chapter 2 it was 
determined that the swine management cooperative should use 
contracts that are similar to others used in the swine 
industry. The cooperative's advantage and attractiveness to 
its members comes from the distribution of any cooperative 
surplus in the form of patronage refunds rather than offering 
more favorable contracts. 
One possible advantage for a farmer-member who joins the 
cooperative is the increase in production performance that is 
attained as a result of the management services supplied by 
the cooperative. In addition to improved performance caused 
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by management services, there may also be further increases in 
performance if the farmer-members are placed under an 
incentive-based contract where the payment they receive 
depends on the production level they are able to achieve. 
Two specific contracts that have been included in the 
model for each of the three production stages. An attempt has 
been made to find incentive-based and fixed payment contracts 
which are representative of contracts currently used in the 
industry. Within each production stage there are two 
contracts: (1) contract F, a fixed payment contract, and (2) 
contract I, an incentive-based contract. The contract 
specifics are as follows: 
1. Feeder pig production contracts 
Contract F: 
conditions: 
Farmer-member supplies facilities and labor. 
Cooperative supplies breeding herd and replacements, 
veterinary supplies, utilities, feed, drugs, 
managerial services, and retains ownership of all 
pigs. 
payment: 
$10.00 per month for each sow and gilt in inventory 
$12.00 per 40 lb. feeder pig produced 
Contract I: 
conditions: 
Farmer-member supplies facilities and labor. 
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Cooperative furnishes breeding stock, medication, 
feed, managerial services, utilities, and owns pigs. 
payment: 
payment is based entirely on weaned average per sow 
No. Dollars/ No . Dollars/ No. Dollars/ 
weaned 12.ig weaned 12.ig weaned 12.ig 
<7.6 13.40 8 . 5 16. 25 9.5 17.87 
7.6 13.80 8 . 6 16. 5 0 9.6 18.06 
7.7 14.10 8.7 16 . 7 5 9.7 18.25 
7.8 14.40 8.8 16.93 9.8 18.33 
7.9 14 . 70 8.9 17 . 10 9.9 18.41 
8.0 15.00 9.0 17.23 10.0 18.50 
8.1 15.25 9.1 17.36 10.1 18.62 
8.2 15.50 9.2 17.50 10.2 18.75 
8.3 15.75 9.3 17.62 10.3 18.90 
8.4 16.00 9.4 17. 7 5 10.4 19.00 
>10 . 4 19.10 
2. Feeder pig finishing contracts 
Contract F: 
conditions: 
Farmer- member provides and maintains facilities and 
provides labor. 
Cooperative provides feed, pigs, transportation, 
veterinary supplies, medicine, utilities, and 
managerial services. 
payment: 
$ . 08 per day per pig 
Contract I: 
conditions : 
Farmer-member provides labor and provides and 
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maintains facilities and equipment. 
Cooperative provides feed, pigs, transportation, 
veterinary supplies, utilities, and managerial 
services. 
payment: 
based on the average of two performance measures 
feed efficiency 
lbs. feedL.lb. gain ~L.dayL_:gig death loss % ~L.dayL:gig 
<3.2 . 22 <l .085 
3.2 .20 1 to 1. 99 .08 
3.3 .18 2 to 2.49 .075 
3.4 .16 2.5 to 3 . 49 . 07 
3 . 5 .14 3.5 to 4.49 . 065 
3.6 .13 4.5 to 5.49 .06 
3.7 . 12 5.5 to 6.99 .055 
3.8 .11 7 to 9.99 .05 
3.9 .10 >10 . oo 
>3.9 .09 
payment per day per pig = feed efficiency + death loss % 
2 
3 . Farrow to finish contracts 
Contract F: 
conditions: 
Farmer-member owns and maintains facilities and 
supplies labor. 
Cooperative supplies feed, medication, veterinary 
supplies, managerial services, pays transportation 
costs, and owns the hogs. 
payment: 
$14.00 per head out of nursery 
$15.00 per head out of nursery if more than 9.2 pigs 
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per litter are produced. 
$5.00 per head into finisher 
$5.00 per head out of finisher 
Contract I: 
conditions: 
Farmer-member owns and maintains facilities and 
supplies labor and all other non-feed inputs. 
Cooperative supplies feed, managerial services, and 
owns the hogs. 
payment: 
$17.00 per cwt produced to cover all non-feed costs 
plus $5.00 per cwt produced guaranteed profit. 
By combining the three production stages, four swine 
operation sizes, and two contract structures there are 24 
(3X4X2) different swine farm activities which can comprise the 
membership in the swine management cooperative. One of the 
next questions to be answered by the cooperative is what 
combination of activities is optimal for a given risk/ return 
tradeoff. This cooperative decision deals with portfolio 
theory. 
Portfolio Theory 
From the above discussion it is apparent that one of the 
management problems for the cooperative is to choose an 
optimal combination of activities. There is a range of 
expected returns and risk levels the 24 activities. The 
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choice of activities made by the cooperative will determine 
its surplus and the risk that it faces. Portfolio theory is a 
method that the cooperative can use to make this risk/ return 
decision. 
The aim of portfolio analysis is to allocate resources 
across an array of risky assets that maximizes the decision 
maker's utility (Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker, 1977). For 
the swine management cooperative, portfolio analysis will 
determine what portfolio or combination of swine farm 
activities will maximize its utility. 
One of the earliest studies of portfolio selection was 
by Markowitz (1959). Markowitz (1959) derived an expected net 
return-variance frontier and argued that points along this 
frontier maximize expected utility. The efficient frontier is 
defined by Markowitz (1959) as combinations of investments 
that provide the highest return for a certain level of risk or 
the lowest risk for a certain expected return level. Risk is 
measured by the variance of the returns in the portfolio. The 
efficient set is defined by combinations of assets that have 
the maximum expected return (E) for a given level of variance 
(V), or the minimum V for a given level of E . The efficient 
set is also known as the E-V frontier. Analysis of the E-V 
frontier shows that portfolios with high returns have high 
risk and those with low returns have lower risk. 
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Diversification in portfolio theory 
Diversification plays an important role in portfolio 
theory. If asset returns are not perfectly correlated it is 
possible to combine different assets to get a lower variance 
with the same expected return as a single asset. The 
selection of a diversified portfolio reduces risks because the 
returns from the assets don't fluctuate in unison. Portfolios 
which are located on the E-V frontier as defined by Markowitz 
(1959) are combinations of assets which have been diversified 
to reduce risk. 
Diversification plays a role in portfolio analysis for 
the swine management cooperative, but not in the traditional 
sense. Traditionally diversification is used to refer to 
combinations of assets whose returns fluctuate independently 
or inversely to each other. In the cooperative each of the 
swine farm activities is subjected to the same input and 
output prices at any one time. However, production variables 
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed. 
Consequently, the correlation of activity returns will be 
strongly influenced by the relative importance of price on 
production risk . The benefits of diversification for the 
cooperative will come from differences in the magnitude of 
risk associated with the different sizes and types of swine 
enterprises. The returns from the smaller operations will 
tend to fluctuate less in absolute terms than the returns from 
the larger operations. By selecting portfolios of various 
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sizes of swine operations the cooperative will be able to 
select a particular risk/ return combination, even though the 
returns from all assets tend to fluctuate together. 
MOT AD 
A convenient quantitative method for portfolio analysis 
is MOTAD (minimizing of total absolute deviations) . Hazell 
(1971) developed a linear programming method as an alternative 
to quadratic E-V (expected income-variance) decision criteria 
to avoid difficulties in computation. One of the drawbacks of 
quadratic programming in deriving an E-V frontier is the data 
requirement of the variances and covariances among all 
activities. These values are generally unknown and are 
usually only estimated from time series or cross-sectional 
data on observed gross margins. The linear programming method 
introduced by Hazell (1971) avoided this data requirement. 
Linear programming models also have advantages in 
computational ease over quadratic risk programming models 
(Hazell, 1971). 
Hazell's (1971) linear programming method minimizes total 
absolute deviations around a mean level of income. The risk 
efficient frontier is derived from expected income-absolute 
deviations (E-A) portfolios. An E-A portfolio is defined as 
having minimum mean absolute income deviations (A) for a given 
expected income level (E) . An E-A frontier is developed by 
parametrically running the linear programming model with 
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respect to mean income and minimizing deviations from mean 
income (Watts et al., 1984). Hazell (1971) demonstrated 
through a numerical example that the MOTAD model is justified 
as an alternative computational method for deriving efficient 
E-A portfolios as compared to a quadratic E-V model. 
The MOTAD model has the following form: 
(1) Maximize rx 
Subject to: 
(2) Ax <= b 
( 3 ) Rx + Iy >= 0 
(4) vy <= L 
(5) x,y >=O 
where 
r, is a 1 x N vector of expected income for each of the 
N activities, 
x, is an N x 1 vector of activity levels, 
A, is an M x N matrix of resource or technical 
coefficients, where M is the number of limiting 
resources or constraints, 
b, is an M x 1 vector of resource or technical levels, 
R, is an S x N matrix of the differences between actual 
annual income and the average annual income for each 
of the N activities, where s is the number of 
observations (years or states of nature) considered, 
I, is an S X S identity matrix, 
y, is an s x 1 vector of absolute income deviations for 
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each observation, 
O, is an S x 1 vector of O's, 
v, is a 1 x s vector of l's, and 
L, is the maximum allowable deviations from the mean 
income. 
This MOTAD model is similar in construction to the models used 
by Anderson, Dillon, and Hardaker (1977); and Watts et al. 
(1984). 
The actual annual returns to the cooperative for each 
activity in the model are derived from a LOTUS 1-2-3 
spreadsheet which has been linked to a random number 
generator. Results from the spreadsheet models on the value 
of the cooperative surplus for each of the 24 swine farm 
activities for 100 years of observations or states of nature 
are input into the MOTAD model. The model is then run by 
parametrically changing L to see how the composition of the 
swine management cooperative changes with increasing levels of 
allowable risk. Each change in the basis which is caused by 
changing L results in a different combination of swine farm 
activities for the cooperative. By plotting the different 
risk/return levels an efficient E-A frontier can be depicted 
for the cooperative. 
The software package utilized to solve the MOTAD model is 
the General Algebraic Modelling System GAMS (Brooke, Kendrick, 
and Meeraus, 1988). MINOS was used as the solution algorithm. 
GAMS is designed to make the construction and solution of 
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large, complex mathematical programming models more straight 
forward and easier to understand by users of models from other 
disciplines. 
Spreadsheet Models 
A spreadsheet model of a swine operation for each of the 
24 different swine farm activities was developed on LOTUS 
1-2-3. The spreadsheet models were originally derived from 
microcomputer worksheets developed by Iowa State University 
(Miller et al . , 1984, 1985a, and 1985b) and then modified to 
fit the present analysis. Spreadsheet models were constructed 
for feeder pig production and feeder pig finishing. The 
farrow-to-finish spreadsheet is basically a combination of the 
feeder pig production and feeder pig finishing spreadsheets. 
The spreadsheet model allows the user to input all the 
prices, building costs, feed costs, performance measures and 
other inputs used in calculating a budget for a model of a 
swine farm. Examples of some of the variables which are 
inputted into the model include: s ize of operation (number of 
sows or pigs finished), litters/ sow/ year, pigs weaned/ litter, 
death rate, feed efficiency, average labor hours/ pig, average 
pig sell i ng weight, daily sow and boar feed intake, useful 
boar life, average weight for cull sows and boars , and number 
of boars on hand. In addition, the model incorporates the 
following costs and prices: labor cost, utilities and fuel 
cost/ litter, veterinary supplies cost/ litter, marketing 
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cost/pig, miscellaneous operating costs, corn and supplement 
prices, price for purchasesd gilts and boars, price for cull 
sows and boars, market hog price, feeder pig price, total 
dollar investment in buildings and equipment, annual 
depreciation for buildings and equipment, and taxes and 
insurance. 
The spreadsheet models produce budgets for the 24 swine 
farm activities. Some outputs from the model include: total 
revenue, total variable cost, total fixed cost, and profit. 
The model also outputs some performance measures such as: 
return to capital, labor, and management; hourly return to 
labor; return/ $100 feed fed; and breakeven selling price. 
The spreadsheet models are modified to include contract 
provisions which divide the income from the swine operation 
between the farmer-member and the cooperative. 
Feed rations 
In the spreadsheet models the feed rations and the 
amounts fed to breeding stock and feeder pigs are fixed so 
they are constant across all 24 different swine farm 
activities. The spreadsheet allows the input for the amount 
of feed consumed per day by sows and boars, but the ration is 
fixed at 14 % protein. Each feeder pig is assumed to consume 
26 pounds of starter feed from weaning to 30 pounds. From 30 
to 100 pounds the pigs consume a 16% ration and then a 14% 
ration after 100 pounds to market weight. All rations consist 
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of corn-soybean meal mixes where the soybean meal includes 
additives for vitamins and minerals. 
Building costs 
Building costs for swine facilities were obtained from 
Dwaine Bundy (1990). The building costs used in the 
spreadsheets are: 
breeding = $300.00 per sow 
farrowing = $2350.00 per crate 
nursery = $90.00 per pig 
grower = $120.00 per pig 
finisher= $180.00 per pig. 
There are some implications due to the assumption of 
constant unit building costs for the cooperative model. 
Building costs are not adjusted as the size of the swine 
operation is changed, which ignores economies of size. 
Building costs for the different sized swine farm activities 
are just scale multiples of each other. The primary reason 
for constant building costs is the difficulty and lack of 
objective information on building cost differences for 
different sized operations. 
Prices 
Price levels used for corn, soybean meal, feeder pigs, 
and market hogs were based on average Iowa prices for the past 
16 years. The 16-year time series data on these prices were 
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obtained from Agricultural Prices 1989-1974 Summaries. Prices 
prior to 1974 were not used because of the significant 
increase that occurred in agricultural prices in the early 
1970's. 
The MOTAD model will treat a time series of prices as 
independent draws from a stationary distribution. After 
analyzing the trends and variability in these price time 
series, it was determined that nominal prices provided a more 
realistic distribution for future prices rather than did real 
prices. The trend line based on nominal prices for all four 
commodities over the 16-year period is essentially flat. The 
nominal prices are shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 for corn, 
soybean meal, market hogs, and feeder pigs. Figures 3.4 and 
3.5 show the inflation-adjusted prices. 
If the prices are deflated using an implicit deflater for 
GNP, 1982:100, then the trend line over the 16-year period 
decreases. For example, with inflation-adjusted corn prices 
the trend line shows that prices decreased an average of $0.18 
per bushel over the period, while the trend line based on 
nominal prices shows an decrease of $0.02 per bushel over the 
period. Consequently, the inflation-adjusted corn prices for 
1974 and 1986 are $5.05 and $1.24 per bushel, respectively, 
while the nominal prices for the same years are $2.80 and 
$1.41 per bushel, respectively. The real price series implies 
a level of variability that seems unl i kely. Inflation-
adjusted price levels for the four commodities tend to 
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Figure 3 .2 Nominal feed prices 
1974 - 1989 
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Figure 3 .3 Nominal hog prices 
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Figure 3 .5 Inflation-adjusted hog prices 
1974- 1989 
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fluctuate over a wider range than the nominal prices. The 
nominal price levels provide a more realistic estimate of the 
price distribution which will be faced by the swine management 
cooperative today. 
Modelling Price and Production Risk 
An attachment to LOTUS 1-2-3 was used which allows 
probability distributions to be inputted for variables in the 
swine farm activity spreadsheet models. Distributions were 
included in the cooperative model to incorporate price and 
production risk into the returns to the cooperative and the 
farmer-members. Distributions were placed in the models for 
five management-influenced variables identified later, labor 
hours per litter for producing feeder pigs, labor hours per 
pig for finishing pigs, and the four price levels discussed in 
the previous section. 
@Risk program 
The computer program used to analyze the spreadsheets and 
obtain expected results was @Risk (Palisade Corporation, 1988) 
which operates as an attachment to LOTUS 1-2-3. @Risk allows 
the includion of distributions into LOTUS 1-2-3 spreadsheets. 
@Risk is unique in that any form of distribution can be 
inputted into the model using numerical approximation methods. 
In addition, @Risk allows the user to select standard 
distributions such as a normal or triangular distributions. 
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@Risk uses Monte Carlo sampling techniques and randomly 
selects a value for each probability distribution in the 
spreadsheet. The program then calculates all the values in 
the spreadsheet based on those selected from the 
distributions. The frequency of sampling is controlled by the 
user. The program also calculates summary statistics for 
requested output variables such as the return to the 
cooperative and its farmer-members. Each random drawing of 
values from the probability distributions represents one 
observation or state of nature of data which is used in the 
MOTAD model. In this analysis, the Monte Carlo model 
generated 100 observations for the MOTAD model. 
Price distributions were approximated by uniformly 
drawing samples from the 16-year time series data over the 
period 1974 to 1989 so that each year has an equally likely 
chance of being selected. 
Dependency relationships 
@Risk also allows for approximating correlations among 
variables. A statistical analysis of the data from the Iowa 
State University swine records (Stevermer, 1990) showed the 
following correlations which have been approximated in the 
spreadsheets: 
1. litters per sow per year and pigs weaned per litter 
= +.184 
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2. litters per sow per year and death loss percent from 
weaning to market = +.039 
3. death loss percent for finishing pigs and feed 
efficiency for finishing feeder pigs = +.36 
4. death loss percent for finishing pigs and hours of 
labor per pig for finishing feeder pigs = + . 251 
Iowa State's swine records data base consists of swine 
enterprise records from Iowa producers. There are 
approximately 300 farrow-to-finish producers, 50 feeder pig 
producers, and 50 feeder pig finishers annually in this data 
base. It is important to note that the correlations between 
these variables are rather weak. 
Management related variables 
The spreadsheets include management related variables 
which are assumed to change in response to the management 
services provided by the cooperative. The increased 
management will lead to improvements in performance measures. 
Five variables from the spreadsheets were identified that 
would capture the total impact of increased levels of 
management. They are litters per sow per year, pigs weaned 
per litter, death loss percent from weaning to market, feed 
efficiency for finishing feeder pigs, and death loss percent 
for finishing feeder pigs. Two other important management 
influenced variables on hours of labor per litter for 
producing feeder pigs and hours of labor per pig for finishing 
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feeder pigs were also identified. However, these were not 
included because they are inputs rather than performance 
measures. The contract payments from the cooperative to the 
farmer-members are a return to facilities and labor. The 
cooperative contract payments are based on the number of pigs 
produced which depends directly on the first five management 
related variables and not on hours of labor used per pig. 
Since data on the effects of increased management on the 
five performance variables is not available, an effort was 
made to estimate the expected response. Probability 
distributions were developed based on data from Iowa State 
University's swine enterprise records (Stevermer, 1990) for 
the five variables and it was assumed that the distributions 
accurately represent all Iowa swine producers. This data base 
contains swine enterprise records for Iowa producers who use 
Iowa State's record keeping program. There were approximately 
1200 observations from four years of data on litters per sow 
per year, pigs weaned per litter, and death loss percent from 
weaning to market. Approximately 150 observations from three 
years were available on feed efficiency and death loss for 
finishing feeder pigs. 
A procedure was developed to use expert opinions to 
subjectively estimate the needed probability distributions. 
The function and goals of the management cooperative were 
explained to each expert at the beginning of each session. 
The experts were informed that they were allowed to change 
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facility design, breeding stock, feed rations, and other 
variables. These experts were then asked to draw on the 
original distribution how they believed it would shift if the 
population of Iowa swine producers, represented in the 
distributions, were placed under increased management and 
engaged in contracting with the management cooperative. The 
altered distributions were obtained independently from each 
expert and no revisions were permitted. Finally, the four 
expert opinions were averaged and this average distribution 
was used in the swine enterprise spreadsheets. 
The experts represented experienced contractors and swine 
production specialists. Expert A is a contractor and a 
supplier of managerial services to hog producers. Expert A 
specializes in smaller sow operations and contracts primarily 
with feeder pig producers and farrow-to-finish operations. 
Expert B is also a contract hog producer with a large record 
keeping service. Expert B's clients include larger operations 
and all three stage of production groups. Expert A and B both 
have extensive data bases on the performance of swine 
producers raising hogs under contract with increased 
management. Expert c is a professor of animal science at Iowa 
State University who specializes in swine production. Expert 
D is a professor of animal science and extension specialist in 
swine production at Iowa State University who also manages a 
record keeping program. 
All the distributions were normalized to make the area 
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under each distribution the same with @Risk. The shape o f 
each distribution was approximated by linear segments and 
entered into @Risk in distributional form. 2000 iterations 
were then performed on each distribution to normalize them. 
Finally, the four expert distributions were averaged to obtain 
the distribution to use in the swine farm activities . 
The original distributions, the four expert opinion-based 
distributions, and the distribution showing the average of the 
four experts are shown in Figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. 
Table 3.1 shows some statistics on the distributions. A 
visual observation of the distributions shows the optimism 
that these four experts have on the amount of improvement that 
can be achieved by Iowa swine producers. 
Table 3.1 also gives some interesting data on the 
distributions. In addition to estimating increased 
performance caused by the management services, these experts 
also predicted a decrease in the variability of the five 
performance measures. The standard deviation, which is a 
measure of variability, for each of the four expert-based 
distributions is smaller than the original standard deviation 
over all five performance variables. The experts predicted 
that the distributions are going to shift and become taller 
and narrower as the range in variability for the performance 
measures decreases with the increased management supplied by 
the cooperative . 
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Table 3.2 Statistics on probability distributions from 
Figures 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10 
distribution 
litters per 
original 
expert A 
expert B 
expert C 
expert D 
average 
average 
sow per year 
1. 88 
2.14 
2.27 
2.21 
2.03 
2.16 
range 
high low 
(Figure 3.6) 
2.85 0.83 
2.64 1.64 
2.61 2.01 
2.44 1.83 
2.57 1.52 
2.64 1.52 
pigs weaned per 
original 
expert A 
expert B 
expert c 
expert D 
average 
litter (Figure 3.7) 
8.25 11.18 
9.24 11.17 
9.32 10.32 
9.13 10.39 
8.58 10.97 
9. 07 11. 17 
4.08 
7.54 
6.85 
8.05 
5.82 
5.82 
standard deviation 
0.292 
0.224 
0.122 
0.100 
0.207 
0.182 
0.967 
0.780 
0.616 
0.336 
1.072 
0.804 
death loss percent, 
original 
weaning 
6.49 
3.50 
5.77 
4.11 
4.93 
4.58 
to market (Figure 
31.27 0.35 
3.8) 
3.828 
1.310 
2.848 
1.511 
2.246 
2.241 
expert A 
expert B 
expert C 
expert D 
average 
7.06 0.26 
17.09 1.34 
8.03 0.13 
12.56 0.39 
17.09 0.13 
feed efficiency 
original 
expert A 
expert B 
expert C 
expert D 
average 
(Figure 3.9) 
death loss percent, 
original 
expert A 
expert B 
expert c 
expert D 
average 
367.6 493.0 
345.0 393.0 
357.1 471.9 
319.4 354.4 
354.4 397.6 
344.0 471.9 
finishing pigs 
4.89 13.75 
3.65 8.50 
3.91 12.11 
3.64 7.79 
5.38 8.27 
4.15 12.11 
285.1 
294.7 
288.5 
281.3 
307.4 
281. 3 
(Figure 
0.01 
0.30 
0.50 
0.02 
0.55 
0.02 
37.9 
22.6 
36.3 
12.2 
18.1 
28.3 
3 .10) 
2.674 
1.884 
1. 897 
1.543 
1.367 
1. 849 
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Expected values 
The spreadsheets calculate the contribution to total 
cooperative surplus and the individual farmer-member profit 
for each of the 24 different swine farm activities. One 
hundred iterations with @Risk were generated which represents 
100 observations or years of data for each of the 24 
activities. These observations are then averaged for each 
activity to obtain expected values for the contribution to 
total cooperative surplus and individual farmer-member 
profits. 
The four price distributions were seeded with @Risk which 
causes the program to draw the same sequence of random numbers 
for the 100 observations for each activity. In this way, all 
swine activities face the same set of input and output prices 
for each draw or state of nature. However, production 
variables were drawn independently for each farm type. 
Model Specifications 
Initial run 
The initial run of the MOTAD model was constrained by a 
maximum number of 25 farmer-members. A constraint on the 
membership implies maximization of returns per member. A 
constraint is also included in the model which limits the 
number of feeder pigs finished to less than or equal to the 
number of feeder pigs produced. This constraint ensures that 
farmer-members who finish feeder pigs obtain their pigs from 
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farmer-members in the cooperative who produce feeder pigs. 
This constraint reflects the assumption that the cooperative 
would attempt to provide a predictable supply of feeder pigs 
to farmer-members who finish pigs and also eliminate problems 
with purchasing feeder pigs in co-mingled groups with unknown 
genetics. This was an assumption that was assumed by the four 
experts when eliciting their opinions on how the distributions 
would change or shift for the management-influenced variables. 
The objective function for the MOTAD model also includes 
a cost of $35,000.00 to cover the costs of providing 
managerial services. The $35,000 .00 is an approximation of 
the marginal costs of providing management services to 25 
producers (Crosser, 1991; Junkers, 1991) . 
Second run 
A second run of the MOTAD model was analyzed to determine 
how the portfolio of the swine managment cooperative would 
change with a different size constraint. In the second model, 
a limit is placed on the total financing available for the 
farmer-members to purchase new buildings. This actual limit, 
$29,500,000, represents the total financing that is used in 
the initial run at the risk neutral solution. With a capital 
constraint, the number of members is free to vary. 
The remaining model specifications for the second run are 
essentially the same as the first. The constraint which 
limits the number of feeder pigs finished to less than or 
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equal to the number of feeder produced has been included. The 
costs of supplying managerial services remain at the same per-
member level of $1,400.00 . However , the total cost of 
supplying managerial services now depends on the number of 
members. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
By running the swine management cooperative MOTAD model 
parametrically with respect to L, the expected deviations from 
mean income, a risk/return efficiency frontier is traced. The 
initial run developed an efficiency frontier for the swine 
management cooperative with a constraint limiting its farmer-
members to a maximum of 25. The second run of the model 
analyzed the swine management cooperative with a constraint on 
the maximum financing available to build new facilities of 
$29,500,000. The results show the portfolios that are 
available for the cooperative and the different risk/ return 
levels the portfolios have. 
Initial MOTAD Model 
The primary objective of the initial run of the 
cooperative MOTAD model was to determine what combinations of 
swine farm activities were optimal for the swine management 
cooperative at different risk levels and to determine if 
sufficient profit is generated by the farmer-member's swine 
operations with the increased management to support the 
activities of the cooperative and to provide the farmer-
members with an acceptable return to their buildings, labor, 
and effort. 
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Results 
The results of the initial run of the MOTAD model are 
presented below. Figure 4.1 shows the efficiency frontier 
which was estimated from parametrically running the model with 
respect to L, the expected deviation from mean income. Table 
4.1 shows the swine management cooperative portfolios at the 
points labeled A through F on the efficiency frontier. 
From $0 to $332,867 expected deviations (L) the model is 
constrained by L, rather than the number of members. The 
portfolio of the cooperative is as follows: 
11.8% FPP.S.I, 
5.0% FPF.M.F, 
53.8% FTF.V.F, 
26.4% FTF.M.F, and 
3.0% FTF.L.F. 
From $332,868 to $887,500 expected deviations (L) the 
member constraint becomes binding. Over this range the 
portfolio for the cooperative is made up of varying 
combinations of feeder pig producers, feeder pig finishers, 
and farrow-to-finish operators. 
Above $887,500 expected deviations the feeder pig 
producers and feeder pig finishers fall out of the portfolio 
and the cooperative is made up entirely of combinations of 
medium and large farrow-to-finish producers under fixed 
contract. At approximately $1,560,000 expected deviations the 
medium farrow-to-finish producers are eliminated from the 
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Table 4.1 Portfolio combinations from the MOTAD model for 
different trade-offs between risk and cooperative 
surplus for the swine management cooperative with 
a maximum of 25 members 
Solution Number 
from Figure 4.1 
Expected Deviations from 
A 
Mean Income (Risk) 200,000 
Expected Cooperative 
Surplus ($) 443,145 
Activities: 
(number of members) 
FPP.I.S8 1.8 
FPP.I.L 
FPF.F.M 0.7 
FTF.F.V 8.1 
FTF.F.M 4.0 
FTF.F.L 0.5 
Total Members 15.1 
B c 
332,867 700,000 
760,794 1,621,919 
2.9 
0.2 
1.2 0.4 
13.4 5.2 
6.6 15.3 
0.8 4.0 
24.9 25.1 
--------------------------------------------------------------
8 FPP.I.S stands for a small, 100 sow (S), feeder pig 
producer (FPP) , under the incentive-based (I) 
contract. 
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D E F 
887,500 1,100,000 1,600,000 
2,056,023 2,513,770 3,441,788 
0.1 
0.2 
18.8 12.7 
25.1 25.0 25.0 
-----------------------------------------
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portfolio. This portfolio is equivalent to the risk neutral 
solution. 
The efficient frontier in Figure 4.1 shows the 
risk/return tradeoff that the cooperative faces. With lower 
levels of risk the cooperative is diversified to capture the 
gains from several assets with different levels of risk. At 
extremely high values of L, the risk neutral solution, the 
cooperative specializes in the asset with the highest return, 
the large farrow-to-finish producer under a fixed contract. 
The efficiency frontier's relative lack of curvature suggests 
that the managers of the cooperative might select any point 
along the frontier. The composition of the cooperative will 
be extremely sensitive to the risk attitudes of the directors. 
The frontier is convex so that there will be a point of 
tangency between the cooperative's indifference curve and the 
frontier. Note, however, that with relatively flat 
indifference curves, implying a low level of risk aversion, 
the cooperative could choose portfolio F . 
By simply taking a ratio of the risk level to the 
expected return for various points along the efficiency 
frontier in Figure 4.1 an inference about the returns to the 
swine farm activities in the portfolios can be made. Over the 
frontier the ratio of risk to return varies slightly between 
.43 to 1 and .47 to 1. The benefits for the swine management 
cooperative from diversification don't come from uncorrelated 
returns but from risk differences between assets. The smaller 
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swine farm activities are less risky in an absolute sense and 
their return doesn't vary as much as the larger swine farm 
activities. At low levels of risk, the MOTAD model selects V, 
S, M, and L swine farm activities to receive the benefits from 
this form of diversification. Table 4.2 shows the actual 
correlations between the swine farm activities represented in 
the efficiency frontier. The high correlations between the 
activities indicates that common price risk dominates the 
independent production risk. The benefits from 
diversification for the swine management cooperative are 
derived from differences in risk levels between assets and not 
uncorrelated returns. 
Table 4.2 Correlation coefficients on the returns to 
cooperative surplus for the activities in the 
initial model run 
FPP.I.S FPP.I.L FPF.F.M FTF.F.V FTF.F.M 
FPP.I.S 1.000 0.979 0 .731 0.843 0.855 
FPP.I.L 1.000 0.748 0.852 0.861 
FPF.F.M 1.000 0.825 0.875 
FTF.F.V 1.000 0.883 
FTF.F.M 1.000 
FTF.F.L 
FTF.F.L 
0.849 
0.868 
0.841 
0 . 867 
0.877 
1. 000 
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Distributing Patronage Refunds 
A second objective for the initial run of the cooperative 
model was to determine whether or not enough profit is 
generated by the improved management to support the 
cooperative and provide farmer-members with an acceptable 
return to their buildings, labor, and effort. Analyzing this 
problem requires developing a method for distributing the 
cooperative surplus to its members. Each farmer-member's 
income comes from the contract payments received plus a 
portion of the total surplus. 
There are several methods which can be used to allocate 
the cooperative surplus. The difficulty in allocation comes 
in deciding what is the most equitable and economically 
efficient way to distribute the earnings to the farmer-
members. Traditional cooperatives that supply feed or other 
supplies allocate their surplus based on the patronage or 
activity of the individual farmer-members. For the swine 
management cooperative allocation could be based on measures 
such as the amount of feed used, the number of pigs produced, 
or even each farmer-member's contribution to the total 
cooperative surplus over a given time period. 
The method used to allocate the cooperative surplus in 
this analysis was based on the relative number of pigs 
produced by each farmer-member. For simplicity the allocation 
is assumed to be the same regardless of whether the farmer-
member produces feeder pigs or market hogs. After 
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consultation with Roger Ginder (1991) about different methods 
of allocating the cooperative surplus this method was 
determined to be the best because of tax considerations. If 
the cooperative allocated the surplus based on each farmer-
member's contribution to the total cooperative surplus, then 
the surplus would be taxed at the cooperative level and at the 
producer level. By using an allocation based on the number of 
pigs produced, the surplus is only taxed once. Single 
taxation is based on the theory that cooperatives operate at 
cost. For example, if it costs $10.00 per pig to supply 
managerial services and the cooperative has a total 
surplus of $12.00 per pig after paying all costs, then by 
allocating $2.00 per pig in the form of patronage refunds the 
cooperative is achieving its basic principle of operation at 
cost and is only subject to single taxation. Note, however, 
that the per pig allocation rule would probably be 
unacceptable to farrow-to-finish operators if there were other 
enterprises in the cooperative because they would tend to use 
the cooperative more on a per pig basis than feeder pig 
finishers. 
At $350,000 expected deviations the cooperative generates 
a surplus of $801,709 and its portfolio of members is: 
swine farm activity 
FPP.I.S 
FPF.F.M 
FTF.F.V 
FTF.F.M 
FTF.F . L 
number 
4 . 5 
1.9 
10.5 
7.4 
0.7 
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Table 4.3 shows the dollar returns and the return on 
assets to each of the five types of members that are in the 
swine management cooperative portfolio at the $350,000 
expected deviations risk level. The assumption was made that 
100% of the total cooperative surplus was distributed to the 
members. 
Table 4.3 Returns to each individual farmer-member before and 
after the allocation of cooperative surplus 
Farmer-Member Return After Contract Return After Surplus 
Payments Only Allocation 
~ ~ ROA ~ ROA 
FPP.I.S $ 9,873.14 9.9% $ 32,499 . 16 32.5% 
FPF.F.M $19,804.14 9 . 1% $ 71,282.32 32.8% 
FTF.F.V $ 3 , 346.93 2.6% $ 14,494.51 11.5% 
FTF.F.M $17,799.45 3.0% $ 72,510 . 69 12 .1% 
FTF.F.L $50,983.73 4.3 % $165,513.63 14.0% 
Table 4.3 shows the benefits to the farmer-members by 
joining and contracting with the swine management cooperative. 
The values in this table are returns to farmer-members after 
fixed building costs have been paid. By contracting with the 
cooperative each farmer-member is able to capture more of the 
profits generated by their operation. Since the contracts 
used are representative of contracts currently being used in 
the swine industry, the cooperative does in fact generate 
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enough return to pay for the costs of providing managerial 
services in addition to providing the farmer-members a higher 
return to their labor and effort than they could achieve by 
contracting with any other organizational form. 
Table 4.3 has some important implications on the 
advantages of contracting with a cooperative as opposed to 
another business form. By capturing more of the profit the 
farmer-members are able to earn a greater return to their 
labor and buildings. Returning the profits to the farmer-
member or retaining the prof its in the local community by the 
cooperative has important implications for Iowa's economy. 
With contracting it is very likely that Iowa will always 
produce large numbers of hogs but if corporate contractors are 
producing the majority of the hogs then all the profits will 
leave the state of Iowa or the local community where the 
profit was generated. The swine management cooperative is 
good for Iowa pork producers and the Iowa economy. 
Second MOTAD Model 
A second efficiency frontier was estimated with a 
constraint on the total financing available to build new 
facilities rather than a member constraint. The total 
financing available of $29,500,000.00 was derived from the 
initial MOTAD model. At the risk neutral level in the initial 
model the portfolio of the cooperative consists of 25 of the 
large farrow-to-finish producers under a fixed contract. The 
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total financing required for the risk neutral portfolio is 
$29,500,000.00. 
Results 
Figure 4.2 shows the efficiency frontier and Table 4.4 
lists the portfolios for points A through F on the efficiency 
frontier. 
From $0 to $1,421,000 expected deviations (L) the model 
is constrained by L, rather than the total financing 
constraint. Over this range the relative composition of the 
portfolio is constant. As L is increased the number of 
members grows and additional financing is acquired. The 
portfolio of the cooperative over this range is as follows: 
2.2% FPP.I.L 
4.6% FPF.F.M 
71.6% FTF.F.M 
21.6% FTF.F.L 
After $1,421,000 expected deviations the model becomes 
constrained by the total financing available and the 
percentage of each asset in the portfolio changes. At 
$1,664,400 expected deviations the medium farrow-to-finish 
members fall out of the portfolio. At approximately 
$1,775,000 expected deviations the larger farrow-to-finish 
members are eliminated from the portfolio. 
Above $1,800,000 expected deviations is equivalent to the 
risk neutral solution. It is made up of large feeder pig 
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Figure 4.2 Second-run MOTAD results 
maximum financing available • $29,500,000 
Table 4.4 Portfolio combinations from the MOTAD model for 
different trade-offs between risk and cooperative 
surplus for the swine management cooperative with 
maximum financing available of $29,500,000.00 
Solution Number 
from Figure 4.2 
Expected Deviations from 
A 
Mean Income (Risk) 100,000 
Expected Cooperative 
Surplus ($) 231,794 
Activities: 
(number of members) 
FPP. I. L8 0.1 
FPF.F.M 0.1 
FTF.F.M 2.1 
FTF.F.L 0.6 
Total Members 2.9 
B c 
1,421,000 1,600,000 
3,293,797 3,561,253 
0.9 15.3 
1. 9 32.8 
30.0 7.8 
9.1 8.7 
41.9 64.6 
--------------------------------------------------------------
8 FPP.I.L stands for a large, 500 sow (S), feeder pig 
producer (FPP), under the incentive-based (I) 
contract. 
D 
1,664,400 
3,647,452 
19.6 
42.l 
70.9 
E 
1,756,850 
3,754,458 
29.9 
64.0 
1. 0 
94.9 
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F 
1,800,000 
3,767,476 
31.1 
66.6 
97.7 
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producers and medium-sized feeder pig finishers. The 
cooperative portfolio has over 97 members. The risk neutral 
portfolio is considerably different from the initial run which 
had 25 large farrow-to-finish members. Both portfolios have 
the same level of total financing but the member constraint in 
the initial run limited the portfolio to 25 members. 
A comparison of Figure 4.2 with Figure 4.1 shows that the 
risk/return tradeoffs for the two models are very similar. 
The similarity between the two models is a result of the high 
correlation coefficients between the activities. Both models 
use the same assets and the problem before the cooperative is 
to determine what portfolio is optimal for a given risk level 
regardless of the constraint. The major difference is the 
portfolio of activities between the two models. At lower risk 
levels the two models are similar with diversified portfolios 
of feeder pig producers, feeder pig finisher, and farrow-to-
finish operations. At higher risk levels the initial run is 
composed of only farrow-to-finish operations while the second 
run's portfolio is composed of feeder pig producers and feeder 
pig finishers at the higher risk levels. 
Another difference between the two models is the risk 
neutral solution. The objective value for the initial model 
is $3,441,788 and $3,767,476 for the second model. 
The two models both have $29,500,000 invested in 
facilities at the risk neutral portfolio. The differences 
come from the initial model constrained by the number of 
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members while the second model is constrained by the total 
financing available. 
The efficiency frontier in Figure 4.2 also shows very 
little curvature. Again, depending on the risk attitudes of 
the directors, the cooperative could exhibit a high degree of 
sensitivity to risk. Alternatively, it could be quite 
insensitive to risk if the optimal portfolio occurs near the 
kink in the efficiency frontier. 
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CHAPTER V. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study investigated the feasibility of a cooperative 
supplying managerial services to swine producers and 
contracting with its members. To analyze this problem a 
linear programming MOTAD model was developed. The MOTAD model 
uses expected values from a spreadsheet that incorporates 
price and production risk into the analysis. The model was 
used to estimate the portfolio of activities for the swine 
management cooperative and its feasibility. 
The motivation for the study was a report which showed 
that only the top 20% to 25% of Iowa swine producers are 
competitive against large-scale ''intensively managed" 
operations that are rapidly expanding in the South. The 
importance of the swine industry to Iowa's economy combined 
with the apparent need to make Iowa swine producers more 
efficient and productive suggested a need for institutional 
innovations to supply managerial skills. 
One of the original objectives of this study was to 
determine the effects of increased management on production 
performance measures. Due to the lac k of data on producer 
response to increased management, distributional changes were 
estimated by eliciting the opinions of four experts. These 
distributions were then normalized and compared to Iowa 
producers. The four experts were in agreement that with a 
combination of improved facilities, genetics, nutrition, and 
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other factors, the efficiency of Iowa producers can be 
significantly improved. 
A spreadsheet model was then developed that incorporated 
estimated changes in performance for 24 different swine farm 
types. The spreadsheet is a budget model of a swine farm 
where the farmer-member is raising hogs under contract. The 
spreadsheet calculates the income from the swine operation and 
then distributes it to the farmer-member and the cooperative 
based on the contract provisions. The spreadsheets also 
incorporate price and production risk into the budget and 
estimate expected returns to the cooperative and the farmer-
member. 
The expected values from the spreadsheets were then used 
in a linear programming MOTAD model to determine the portfolio 
of swine farm activities for the swine management cooperative 
with different levels of risk and a maximum of 25 members. An 
efficiency frontier was developed based on the results from 
the MOTAD model which showed that diversified portfolios can 
be constructed that achieve various risk/ return targets. Each 
portfolio of activities for the swine management cooperative 
has the maximum expected return for a given level of risk. 
The portfolios along the efficiency frontier reflect the 
choices that are available for the cooperative given its risk 
preference. 
The model was used a second time to estimate an 
efficiency frontier with a constraint on the total financing 
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available. A comparison of the two models shows that the 
risk/return tradeoffs between the two models are very similar. 
However, the two models have different portfolios all along 
the efficiency frontier and especially at the risk neutral 
level. 
The portfolio problem for the swine management 
cooperative is a unique one. Portfolios are usually 
diversified to capture the gains from uncorrelated or 
negatively correlated returns. Diversification for the swine 
management cooperative doesn't offer these benefits because 
correlations between the returns are very high. This is due 
to the impact of common price risk overwhelming the 
independent production risk. The swine management cooperative 
uses diversification to combine lumpy assets with different 
risk levels into a portfolio that offers the maximum return 
for a given level of risk. Diversification benefits are 
derived from different risk levels between the assets, rather 
than from negative or uncorrelated returns. In this case, 
however, diversification still serves as a risk management 
tool for the swine management cooperative. 
Another objective of this study was to consider how 
distributing the cooperative's earnings through patronage 
refunds might be accomplished. Because of tax considerations, 
an allocation method was determined that distributed the 
cooperative surplus on the basis of the number of pigs 
produced by each member. 
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One portfolio was then selected from the first run of the 
MOTAD model to analyze the benefits for a farmer-member who 
contracts with the cooperative. After adding the patronage 
refunds to the contract payments received from the cooperative 
the returns to each member in the portfolio increased and in 
some cases doubled. This clearly demonstrates that one of the 
major advantages of contracting with a cooperative as opposed 
to other business forms is retention of some or all of the 
contractor profits. 
The results from the feasibility analysis of a 
cooperative that supplies managerial services to swine 
producers and contracts with its farmer-members shows that it 
is indeed a viable form of business based on the assumptions 
made in this analysis . The success of this cooperative could 
improve the competitive position of Iowa swine producers and 
allow Iowa to maintain its dominant position in the production 
of pork. 
suggestions tor Further Research 
One issue that was originally proposed as an objective of 
this study was to analyze the composition of the swine 
management cooperative if the cooperative financed the 
buildings and equipment for the farmer-members. If the 
cooperative owned the buildings, the contract payments to the 
farmer-members would have to be adjusted to reflect returns to 
the farmer-member for his labor and effort only and not his 
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buildings. There are very few contracts of this type in the 
industry today. It is not clear that pooling or risk sharing 
by the cooperative would have an impact on credit acquisition, 
cost, or servicing. Further, if the cooperative owns the pigs 
and the buildings and supplies the management, then the 
farmer-members are virtually hired labor for the cooperative 
and may lack the involvement required for success. 
Another issue which could be investigated further deals 
with the contracts. The contract only serves to divide the 
income between the farmer-member and the cooperative. When 
the cooperative selects portfolios it merely selects the 
contract style which gives the cooperative the most return and 
the farmer-member the least. The division of income between 
the contract payment and surplus has important implications 
for risk sharing and incentives . Contracts must also be 
examined from an efficiency and equity perspective. 
There are no differences reflected in performance or 
income between the two contracts. The four experts were not 
able to distinguish the effects of incentive-based contracts 
from those of improved management services. 
In this study, costs of production and performance 
measures were kept the same for all four sizes of swine 
operations. Data on the differences in these variables is 
difficult to locate. Economic theory suggests that larger 
operations may have different cost levels and performance 
measures due to economies of scale. 
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Another assumption which was used in this study was the 
restricti on of building designs to only confinement buildings 
and equipment. The model could be analyzed again using 
confinement, loose housing, or pasture systems. To analyze 
this situation it would be necessary to find data on the 
differences in production measures and costs between the three 
different systems. 
Finally, the a c ceptabi lity of the swi ne management 
cooperative by farmers and cooperative managers needs to be 
closely examined. What seems feasible on paper may require 
significant changes in attitudes and behavior in practice. In 
order for the coopera tiv e to work, f a rme rs would be required 
to give up some control and power. Whether or not this 
tradeoff would be acceptable is an empirical question. 
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